Auction Market Design
Auction Market Design
批准号:
1525730
负责人:
Paul Milgrom
金额:
$24.2万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2015
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2015-07-01 至 2019-06-30
中文摘要
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英文摘要
The research objective of this project is to create new knowledge, methods and analytical tools for such auctions as the FCC's incentive auction, in which television broadcast rights worth billions of dollars will be reassigned among broadcasters, and Internet advertising auctions, which are the main revenue source for many modern Internet-based companies. In the first of these applications, there are hundreds of thousands of radio-interference constraints that limit the combinations of rights that may be granted to broadcasters. These constraints make this the most computationally challenging resource allocation problem ever managed using an auction. In the second application, the hard challenge is one of adverse selection, which arises when different bidders have access to very different information. For example, in Internet advertising, advertisers who benefit directly from clicks on their links are much better informed than brand advertisers who benefit by increasing consumer awareness for purchase decisions in brick-and-mortar stores. In this project, the PI's team will analyze new auction mechanisms to overcome the challenges of computation and adverse selection, and new game theoretic methods to analyze the likely outcome of alternative auction designs. The first three tasks to be undertaken in this project are these: (1) to develop and prove theorems about the FCC incentive auction mechanism, which involves solving an NP-complete resource allocation problem, and to characterize how the computational challenges affect the efficiency of the allocation, as well as the incentives, cost, and simplicity of the auction mechanism, (2) to characterize a new, adverse-selection free auction mechanism for Internet advertising auctions and evaluate its performance in a variety of environments, and (3) to develop a new game-theoretic equilibrium refinement that is both well-founded in fundamental principles and also powerful for eliminating implausible Nash equilibria of a class of auction games.
期刊论文(1)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
时钟拍卖和无线电频谱重新分配
DOI:
10.1086/704074
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
Journal of Political Economy
影响因子:
8.2
作者:
[Milgrom, Paul, Segal, Ilya]
通讯作者:
Segal, Ilya
Auction Design for Complex Centralized Markets
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批准号:1947514
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$27.7万
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财政年份:2020
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
SBIR Phase I: Incorporating Bidder Budgets in Multi-Item Auctions
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批准号:0946124
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:2010
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
Market Design
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批准号:0648293
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$14.1万
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财政年份:2007
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
ITR: Collaborative Research: (EVS + ASE) - Soc + int): Electronic Auction Markets
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批准号:0427770
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$44.01万
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财政年份:2004
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
Cumulative Offer Processes
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批准号:0239910
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$23.69万
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财政年份:2003
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
Complementarity: Comparative Statics, Coordination and Change
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批准号:9320733
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$22.22万
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财政年份:1994
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
Economic Theories of the Firm - 2
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批准号:9022792
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$14.32万
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财政年份:1991
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
Summer Workshop in Theoretical Economics to be held at Stanford University, Stanford CA Summer 1990-1992
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批准号:8921589
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$21.4万
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财政年份:1990
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
Theories of the Firm
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批准号:8720782
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$17.83万
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财政年份:1988
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
On the Formal Economic Theory of Organizations
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批准号:8796284
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$6.0万
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财政年份:1987
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
On the Formal Economic Theory of Organizations (Information Science)
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批准号:8420606
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$9.3万
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财政年份:1985
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
On the Role of Information in a Production Organization (Information Science)
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批准号:8411595
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$3.82万
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财政年份:1984
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
On the Role of Information in a Productive Organization (Information Science)
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批准号:8208600
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$3.88万
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财政年份:1982
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
Information and Uncertainty in Competitive Bidding
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批准号:8001932
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$6.97万
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财政年份:1980
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负责人:Paul Milgrom
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依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Applications of AI in Market Design
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批准号:--
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项目类别:外国青年学者研 究基金项目
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批准年份:2024
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负责人:Manshu Khanna
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依托单位:
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market
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批准号:--
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项目类别:外国学者研究基金
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批准年份:2024
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负责人:HAOFEI Z
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依托单位:
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market Reaction: An Explanation Based on Information Asymmetry
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批准号:W2433169
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项目类别:外国学者研究基金项目
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资助金额:--
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批准年份:2024
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负责人:HAOFEI ZHANG
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依托单位: