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Auction Design for Complex Centralized Markets

复杂集中市场的拍卖设计

基本信息

批准号：
1947514
负责人：
Paul Milgrom
金额：
$ 27.7万
依托单位：
Stanford University
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2020
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2020-09-01 至 2024-08-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1947514&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Auction Design Complex Centralized Markets

项目摘要

This project will use economic theory and simulations to study, develop, and improve practically implementable auction designs for complex centralized markets. The project will contribute to our understanding of the effectiveness of auction designs that have been used in recent years to sell packages of radio spectrum, electrical power, internet advertising opportunities, and fishing rights. As our understanding of these kinds of markets has grown, we have come to understand that these market methods must be adjusted to simplify communication and computational complexity and allow for specific features such as economics of scale, very numerous differentiated goods, and exposure risks. This award funds research that will develop methods to evaluate and improve recent auction designs and to create entirely new designs.Markets with combinatorial valuations and/or specialized constraints introduce complexity that limits the effectiveness of current auction methods. Under well-known assumptions, market allocations are efficient. However, even when there are no externalities, information asymmetries, or market power, market-clearing prices may fail to exist, may not be unique, or may not be easily computable. In these cases, decentralized economic systems that are guided by market prices may be dynamically unstable. The project will consider the optimal organization of practical exchanges when this is a possibility. Even when market-clearing prices do not exist, auction mechanisms that combine prices and rationing can lead to nearly optimal results. One part of this project will characterize and evaluate the performance of such mechanisms. Sometimes when market clearing resource prices do in fact exist, the relevant resources are so numerous and differentiated that auctions are impractical. Another part of this project will decide how to apply prices in these settings to meet societal goals.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该项目将使用经济理论和模拟来研究、开发和改进实际可实施的拍卖设计，以适应复杂的集中市场。该项目将有助于我们了解近年来用于出售无线电频谱、电力、互联网广告机会和捕鱼权包的拍卖设计的有效性。随着我们对这类市场的理解不断加深，我们开始认识到，这些市场方法必须进行调整，以简化沟通和计算复杂性，并考虑到规模经济、非常多的差异化商品和暴露风险等特定特征。该奖项资助的研究将开发方法来评估和改进最近的拍卖设计，并创造全新的设计。具有组合估值和/或专门约束的市场引入了复杂性，限制了当前拍卖方法的有效性。在众所周知的假设下，市场配置是有效的。然而，即使在没有外部性、信息不对称或市场力量的情况下，市场出清价格也可能不存在，可能不是唯一的，或者可能不容易计算。在这些情况下，以市场价格为导向的分散经济体系可能是动态不稳定的。在可能的情况下，该项目将考虑实际交流的最佳组织。即使市场出清价格不存在，将价格和配给结合起来的拍卖机制也能带来近乎最佳的结果。这个项目的一部分将描述和评价这些机制的性能。有时，当市场出清资源价格确实存在时，相关资源数量如此之多、差异如此之大，拍卖是不切实际的。该项目的另一部分将决定如何在这些环境中应用价格来实现社会目标。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。