SBIR Phase I: Incorporating Bidder Budgets in Multi-Item Auctions

SBIR 第一阶段：将投标人预算纳入多件拍卖

• 批准号: 0946124
• 负责人: Paul Milgrom
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Auctionomics
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-01-01 至 2010-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0946124&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SBIR; Phase; Incorporating; Bidder; Budgets

This Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase I project will develop auction software that allows bidders to specify budget constraints, and will assess the feasibility of this software for conducting large-scale multi-item auctions. Multi-item auction design has been at the frontier of research in economics and computer science over the past fifteen years. Yet no existing mechanism enables effective competition when bidders face serious budget constraints. New, sealed-bid designs that enable bidders to specify a budget encourage bidders to place more and higher bids, better reflecting values. Sellers will therefore receive higher prices and assignments of goods will be more economically efficient. In multi-item auctions, bidders often cannot risk outcomes where they may be required to pay more than their authorized budgets. Examples are widespread, ranging from online ad placement to auctions of mineral rights and radio spectrum licenses, and rudimentary technologies to account for Internet ad budgets have already been deployed. There is an immediate need for related budget-based technology physical world auctions where the absence of such technology is reducing the number and level of bids. For example, in sales of oil and gas rights by the US DOI, the average number of bids has been only 1.3 per tract, with losing bidders unable to compete for more tracts due to their need to limit budget exposure. Building on economic analyses of multi-item auctions successfully produced under previous efforts, this proposal will take the next step, creating multi-item auction software that allows bidders to work effectively with limited budgets. These auctions will promote more efficient outcomes and higher revenues for sellers. This research will initially assess the feasibility of software for use in oil and gas leasing, which will be a crucial milestone in bringing efficient auctions to other important markets in both the public and private sectors.

这个小型企业创新研究（SBIR）第一阶段项目将开发拍卖软件，允许投标人指定预算限制，并将评估该软件进行大规模多项目拍卖的可行性。 在过去的十五年里，多物品拍卖设计一直处于经济学和计算机科学研究的前沿。然而，当投标人面临严重的预算限制时，现有的机制无法实现有效的竞争。新的密封投标设计使投标人能够指定预算，鼓励投标人提出更多更高的投标，更好地反映价值。因此，卖方将获得更高的价格，并且货物的分配将更具经济效率。 在多件物品拍卖中，投标人通常不能冒可能被要求支付超出授权预算的结果的风险。例子很普遍，从在线广告投放到采矿权和无线电频谱许可证的拍卖，并且已经部署了计算互联网广告预算的基本技术。迫切需要基于预算的相关技术物理世界拍卖，因为缺乏此类技术会减少投标的数量和水平。例如，在美国内政部出售石油和天然气权利的过程中，每块土地的平均投标数量仅为1.3个，失败的投标人由于需要限制预算风险而无法竞争更多的土地。 基于之前成功进行的多项目拍卖的经济分析，该提案将采取下一步行动，创建多项目拍卖软件，使投标人能够在有限的预算下有效地工作。这些拍卖将为卖家带来更高效的结果和更高的收入。这项研究将初步评估用于石油和天然气租赁的软件的可行性，这将是为公共和私营部门其他重要市场带来高效拍卖的一个重要里程碑。