Regulation, Procurement, and Political Economy

该项目重新支持监管研究， 采购合同和政治经济。 的共同主题 在这三个主题中， 机构和私营部门组织。 的 拟议研究的规范性目标是表征 环境中的监管和公共政策的效率 其特点是信息不完整，可观察性有限， 和不完美的可验证性。 积极的目标是 解释监管政策的选择，政府采购 公共支出计划和其他公共政策。 一个令人满意的解释必须把政治上的 政府机构的偏好、特点 政策和方案的选择和设计，以及 受这些政策影响的私人团体。 具体的实质性问题是：1）经济 强调多党模式和 多期监管政策，受到规避， 政治机构，2）政府采购计划， 受逐年拨款和年度政策的限制 审查，以及3）政府监管的政治经济学， 支出方案。 本研究将采取的方法是 基于博弈论、微观经济学和积极的政治 科学 尽管大多数经济行为是由公共政策和 这些政策和制度通常 模型化为外生的，导致预测 不完整或与后续政策不一致 公共机构采用。 这其中的一个主要贡献 项目是将政治行为纳入经济 分析认为，两者都是内生的。

This project renews support for research on regulation, procurement contracting, and political economy. The common theme among these three subjects is the interactions between public agencies and institutions and private sector organizations. The normative objective of the proposed research is to characterize the efficiency of regulatory and public policies in settings characterized by incomplete information, limited observability, and imperfect verifiability. The positive objective is to explain the choice of regulatory policies, government procurement programs, public expenditure programs, and other public policies. A satisfactory explanation must bring together political preferences, features of the public institutions that govern the choice and design of policies and programs, and the interests of the private parties affected by such policies. The specific substantive issues addressed are: 1) the economics of regulation with an emphasis on multiparty models and on multiperiod regulatory policies that are subject to evasion by political institutions, 2) government procurement programs that are subject to year-by-year appropriations and annual policy review, and 3) the political economy of government regulatory and expenditure programs. The approach to be taken in this study is based on game theory, microeconomics, and positive political science. Although most economic behavior is shaped by public policies and institutions, these policies and institutions are typically modeled as exogenous, resulting in predictions that are either incomplete or are inconsistent with the subsequent policies adopted by public institutions. A major contribution of this project is to incorporate political behavior into economic analysis by treating both as endogenous.