Comparative Political Economy

该研究项目侧重于从政治经济学的角度发展公共政策的比较理论，其中政策是在嵌入政治系统的机构内选择的。主要的比较是总统制和议会制之间的比较，以及公共和私人政治和制度之间的比较。政策重点是有组织和无组织的利益对公职人员和私营公职人员选择的影响。在公共政治的背景下，利益试图影响政府的选择和在职政府。在私人政治中。积极分子和利益集团试图在不依赖公共机构的情况下影响经济活动，方法是向公司施加压力，迫使其改变做法，例如改变发展中国家工厂的环境保护政策或工作条件。这项研究计划有三个主要组成部分。第一部分是对议会制和总统制的比较研究，重点是政策选择的动态。议会制模式包括比例代表制选举制度、政府组建和政策选择。总统制的模式包括以地域为基础的选举制度和由总统否决和立法机关的绝对多数产生的立法机关，如美国参议院的阻挠议事。一个目标是将政党作为声誉载体纳入这些制度环境。主要重点是政府的稳定性及其应对经济冲击的政策。第二个组成部分是研究利益集团对政治制度中所选择的政策的影响。该研究概括了现有的共同代理和投票购买理论，将影响形式纳入捐款之外；例如，基层选民动员。这个利益集团理论通过研究选区和利益集团在比例代表制和基于地理的代表制中的影响，与研究计划的第一个组成部分相关。这包括对政府选择和执政政府的影响。本研究的第三个组成部分是私人政治；例如，积极分子团体直接向公司施加压力，试图改变这些公司的做法。这种压力可以采取有组织的消费者抵制或公开揭露海外工厂工作条件等做法的形式。私人政治博弈包括企业和积极分子作为参与者，这种均衡可以对应于私人制度的建立，以减轻承诺、协调、信息和搭便车问题。将内生私人制度的研究扩展到组织电子市场的企业私法。

This research program focuses on the development of comparative theories of public policy from a political economy perspective where policies are chosen within institu-tions embedded in a political system. The principal comparisons are between presidential and parliamentary systems and between public and private politics and institutions. The policy focus is on the influence of organized and unorganized interests on choices by public and private officeholders. In the context of public politics, interests attempt to influence both the choice of government and government in office. In private politics. activist and interest groups attempt to affect economic activity without reliance on public institutions by pressuring firms to change their practices, such as environmental protection policies or working conditions in factories in developing countries.The research program has three principal components. The first is a comparative study of parliamentary and presidential systems with an emphasis on the dynamics of policy choice. The model of parliamentary systems includes a proportional representation electoral system, government formation, and policy choice. The model of a presidential system includes a geography-based electoral system and a legislature with supermajority features arising from a presidential veto override and a legislative supermajority, as in the case of the filibuster in the U.S. Senate. One objective is to incorporate political parties as reputation carriers in these institutional settings. The principal focus is on the stability of governments and their policy responsiveness to economic shocks.The second component is the study of the influence of interest groups on the policies chosen in political systems. The research generalizes existing common agency and vote buying theories to incorporate forms of influence in addition to contributions; e.g., the grassroots mobilization of constituents. This interest group theory is then related to the first component of the research program by studying constituency and interest group influence in proportional representation and geography-based representation systems. This incorporates influence both on the choice of government and government in office.The third component of this research is on private politics; e.g., pressure applied directly to firms by activist groups seeking to change the practices of those firms. This pressure may take the form of an organized consumer boycott or public exposure of practices such as the working conditions in overseas factories. The game of private politics includes firms and activists as players, and the equilibrium can correspond to the establishment of a private institution to mitigate commitment, coordination, information, and free-rider problems. The research on endogenous private institutions is extended to the private law of firms that organize electronic markets.