Political Economy of Regulation and Public Policy

本研究探讨公共机构的设计， 制度特征与公众的关系 这些机构采取的政策。 前者侧重于 设计体制安排，如价格上限制度 以及各国采用的私有化安排 在电信方面，考虑到经济和 政治激励。 该方法处理的能力 政府承诺建立一个长期的激励制度， 并依赖于利益集团的政治行动， 由一段时间以来通过性能发布的信息触发 的激励制度。 对于议会制度， 是发展一种理论， 政府和政策形成是内生的功能， 选举和立法机构。 对美国来说，政党的重要性可能不如 议会制度和利益集团更多地与 个人立法者，而不是政党。 在美国， 目的是调查利益集团在 通过游说和选举资金影响政策。 该研究计划的总体目标是提供一个 公共控制企业和市场的政治经济学理论 作为政治体系结构的一个功能。 的 研究将对我们理解 法规、政治机构，如选举法和 议会政府、利益集团活动和选举 竞争

This research studies the design of public institutions and the relationship between institutional characteristics and the public policies adopted by those institutions. The former focuses on the design of institutional arrangements, such as the price-cap systems and the privatization arrangements being used by various countries in telecommunications, taking into account both economic and political incentives. The approach treats the ability of governments to commit to a long-run incentive system as endogenous and depending on the political action of interest groups as triggered by information released over time through the performance of the incentive system. For parliamentary systems, the objective is to develop a theory in which political parties, coalition governments, and policy formation are endogenous functions of electoral and legislative institutions. For the U.S., parties are perhaps less important than in parliamentary systems, and interest groups interact more with individual legislators than with parties. In the U.S. context, the objective is to investigate the role of interest groups in influencing policies through lobbying and election finance. The overall objective of this research program is to provide a political economy theory of the public control of firms and markets as a function of the structure of the political system. The research will have a significant impact on our understanding of regulation, political institutions such as electoral laws and parliamentary governments, interest group activity, and electoral competition.