Political Economy of Regulation and Public Policy

本研究主要研究公共制度的设计，以及制度特征与公共政策之间的关系。前者的重点是设计体制安排，例如价格上限制度和各国在电信方面正在使用的私有化安排，同时考虑到经济和政治激励。该方法将政府致力于长期激励制度的能力视为内生的，并取决于利益集团的政治行动，这些行动是通过激励制度的绩效随着时间的推移而发布的信息所引发的。对于议会制，目标是发展一种理论，其中政党，联合政府和政策形成是选举和立法机构的内生功能。对美国来说，政党可能不如议会制重要，利益集团与个别立法者的互动多于与政党的互动。在美国的背景下，目标是调查利益集团在通过游说和选举资金影响政策方面的作用。本研究计划的总体目标是提供一种政治经济学理论，将企业和市场的公共控制作为政治体系结构的功能。这项研究将对我们对监管、政治制度（如选举法和议会政府）、利益集团活动和选举竞争的理解产生重大影响。

This research studies the design of public institutions and the relationship between institutional characteristics and the public policies adopted by those institutions. The former focuses on the design of institutional arrangements, such as the price-cap systems and the privatization arrangements being used by various countries in telecommunications, taking into account both economic and political incentives. The approach treats the ability of governments to commit to a long-run incentive system as endogenous and depending on the political action of interest groups as triggered by information released over time through the performance of the incentive system. For parliamentary systems, the objective is to develop a theory in which political parties, coalition governments, and policy formation are endogenous functions of electoral and legislative institutions. For the U.S., parties are perhaps less important than in parliamentary systems, and interest groups interact more with individual legislators than with parties. In the U.S. context, the objective is to investigate the role of interest groups in influencing policies through lobbying and election finance. The overall objective of this research program is to provide a political economy theory of the public control of firms and markets as a function of the structure of the political system. The research will have a significant impact on our understanding of regulation, political institutions such as electoral laws and parliamentary governments, interest group activity, and electoral competition.