Political Economy, Collective Choice, Regulation, and Public Economics

政治经济学、集体选择、监管和公共经济学

• 批准号: 9409559
• 负责人: David Baron
• 金额: $ 21.48万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-09-01 至 1997-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9409559&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Political; Economy; Collective; Choice; Regulation

9409559 Baron This research program has four parts. The first part of the study involves a more complete exploration of information hierarchies. Information hierarchies include public hierarchies, such as, Congress, bureau, state agency, etc. and private hierarchies, such as, manager, foreman, headquarters, etc. The model that is developed addresses current debates about the delegation of authority. It looks at the problem of contracting and subcontracting when information is incomplete and unobservable to at least one of the parties involved. The second part of the study involves the development of collective choice theory from a sequential choice perspective. It focuses on the provision of collective goods rather than particularistic goods. It attempts to include the electorate in the model and addresses questions concerning the amount of information the electorate has about collective goods programs. The third part of the study deals with interest groups and their influence at the electoral and legislative stages of the policy process. The fourth part of the study involves empirical tests of the sequential choice models of collective goods provision using data on entitlement expenditures. This project is of significant interest because it attempts to develop further a relatively novel approach to modeling political institutions, to integrate legislative and electoral determinants of policies, and to provide insights into the nature and evolution of entitlement programs.

9409559男爵这个研究计划有四个部分。这项研究的第一部分涉及对信息层次的更全面的探索。信息层级包括公共层级，如国会、局、州机构等，以及私人层级，如经理、工头、总部等。开发的模型解决了当前关于授权的争论。它着眼于当信息不完整且至少有一方当事人无法观察到信息时的承包和分包问题。本研究的第二部分从顺序选择的角度探讨集体选择理论的发展。它侧重于提供集体物品，而不是特殊物品。它试图将选民包括在模型中，并解决关于选民拥有关于集体物品计划的信息量的问题。研究报告的第三部分涉及利益集团及其在政策进程的选举和立法阶段的影响。研究的第四部分涉及利用应享权利支出数据对集体物品提供的顺序选择模型进行的实证检验。这个项目很有意义，因为它试图进一步发展一种相对新颖的方法来模拟政治机构，整合立法和选举政策的决定因素，并对福利方案的性质和演变提供见解。