Political Economy, Collective Choice, Regulation, and Public Economics

点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要

9409559 Baron This research program has four parts. The first part of the study involves a more complete exploration of information hierarchies. Information hierarchies include public hierarchies, such as, Congress, bureau, state agency, etc. and private hierarchies, such as, manager, foreman, headquarters, etc. The model that is developed addresses current debates about the delegation of authority. It looks at the problem of contracting and subcontracting when information is incomplete and unobservable to at least one of the parties involved. The second part of the study involves the development of collective choice theory from a sequential choice perspective. It focuses on the provision of collective goods rather than particularistic goods. It attempts to include the electorate in the model and addresses questions concerning the amount of information the electorate has about collective goods programs. The third part of the study deals with interest groups and their influence at the electoral and legislative stages of the policy process. The fourth part of the study involves empirical tests of the sequential choice models of collective goods provision using data on entitlement expenditures. This project is of significant interest because it attempts to develop further a relatively novel approach to modeling political institutions, to integrate legislative and electoral determinants of policies, and to provide insights into the nature and evolution of entitlement programs.