Formal Models of Parties and Committees

该奖项支持研究国会在这方面的作用， 委员会在决定立法结果方面发挥作用， 国会的地板。 立法学者早就意识到， 国会委员会做出的决定很少 在国会被推翻 然而，一些委员会 比其他人更受尊重 一些 不过，已经提出了一些解释来解释这种模式， 其中大多数都是推测性的和临时性的。 这项创新研究试图建立在现有的 通过制定正式的 基于立法者是理性行为者这一假设的理论 关注个人利益的最大化， 中央代理人，在这种情况下，由党的领导人。理论上来说 使用所有报告的法案的详细立法历史进行测试 第八十四、八十六、八十八、九十、九十二、九十四届 第96届、第98届和第100届国会 当完成这个项目将有助于我们更好地了解 影响个人的立法过程的动态， 为集体利益而合作。 这样的理解如何 集体商品是在高度分散的 国会的环境对于更好地发展至关重要 科普其他集体财产问题的立法策略 例如削减赤字和竞选资金改革。

This award supports research on the role that congressional committees play in determining the outcome of legislation on the floor of Congress. Legislative scholars have long been aware that the decisions made by congressional committees are rarely overturned on the floor of the Congress. However, some committees are accorded much greater deference than others. A number of explanations have been advanced to explain this pattern, though most of these are somewhat speculative and ad hoc. This innovative research attempts to build upon existing explanations of committee floor success by developing a formal theory based on the assumption that legislators are rational actors concerned with maximizing individual interest but guided by a central agent, in this case by party leaders. The theory will be tested using detailed legislative histories of all bills reported by standing committees in the 84th, 86th, 88th, 90th, 92nd, 94th 96th 98th and 100th Congresses. When completed this project will help us better understand the dynamics of the legislative process that influence individuals to cooperate for collective benefits. Such an understanding of how collective goods are produced in the highly decentralized environment which is Congress is essential for developing better legislative strategies to cope with other collective goods problems such as deficit reduction and campaign finance reform.