Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Ties, Agenda Setting, and Parties in American State Legislatures

如何解释政党在不同立法机构中的影响力差异？ 什么机制负责，在多大程度上，在议会投票中观察到的党派偏见水平？ 根据有条件的政党政府理论，政党内部偏好同质性的变化是关键吗（Aldrich和Rohde，2001）？ 根据程序卡特尔理论，议程控制机构的变化是关键吗（考克斯和麦卡宾斯，2004年）？ 政党是不重要的吗（Kaglibiel 1993）？ 大多数研究提出这样的问题，在美国的背景下集中在国会，但当代国会表现出相对较小的制度或偏好的变化，在战后时期的典型研究相比，在国家一级的变化量。 这个项目旨在利用研究州立法机构提供的几个优势。 各州立法机关在其内部的选举制度和唱名投票模式方面都表现出相当大的差异。 因此，他们提供了一个潜在的有吸引力的样本，通过它的作用，设置机构在带来党的影响。可以检查。 此外，州立法机构还提供自然实验。 以党派关系的形式，最近经常发生。 通过研究党派关系的影响，以及与之相关的制度适应，在唱名表决，本项目将调查政党在州议会的影响力的制度基础。 NSF的资金将用于前往各州首府，收集必要的点名数据和/或采访参与谈判或执行权力分享协议的立法者和工作人员。 学术价值关于政党对各州唱名投票的影响的新兴文献相对较少关注这种影响的制度来源。 虽然国会的辩论越来越多地集中在国会设置机构在带来观察到的政党影响力方面的作用，但战后国会内部缺乏制度变化阻碍了理论辩论的解决。 各州提供了一个天然的实验室，在这个实验室里，各州的机构设置在空间和时间上都有很大的不同。 同样，尽管党派关系在州立法机构中相对普遍，但无论是在其本身还是在其可能的后果方面，都很少受到学术界的关注。 本项目旨在填补这些空白。 更广泛的影响作为第一次全面研究的权力分享协议，已在州立法机构进行党派关系，这项研究可能会揭示一些功能的协议。以及其他在参与者（州立法者和工作人员）自己看来效果不太好的方法。

What explains the variation in party influence in different legislatures? What mechanisms are responsible, and to what degree, for observed levels of partisanship in floor voting? Are variations in preference homogeneity within the parties key, per conditional party government theories (Aldrich and Rohde, 2001)? Are variations in agenda control institutions key, per procedural cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 2004)? Are parties simply unimportant (Krehbiel 1993)? Most studies posing such questions in the American context focus on Congress; but the contemporary Congress exhibits relatively little institutional or preference variation over the postwar period typically studied, when compared to the amount of such variation at the state level. This project seeks to exploit several advantages offered by studying state legislatures. State legislatures exhibit considerable variation in both their internal agenda-settting institutions and their roll call voting patterns. Thus, they offer a potentially attractive sample through which the role of agenda-setting institutions in bringing about .party influence. can be examined. Furthermore, state legislatures offer .natural experiments. in the form of partisan ties, which have occurred with some frequency of late. By studying the impact of partisan ties, and the institutional adaptations associated with them, on roll call voting, this project will investigate the institutional basis of party influence in state legislatures. NSF funding will be used to travel to state capitals and collect the necessary roll call data and/or to interview legislators and staffers involved in negotiating or implementing power-sharing agreements. Intellectual Merit The burgeoning literature on party influence over roll call voting in the states has paid relatively little attention to the institutional sources of such influence. While the debate in Congress has increasingly focused on the role of agenda-setting institutions in bringing about the observed party influence, the lack of institutional variation within the postwar Congress has hampered resolution of theoretical debates. The states offer a natural laboratory in which agenda-setting institutions vary considerably, both across space and time. Likewise, although partisan ties have been relatively common in state legislatures, they have received little scholarly attention, either in themselves or in their possible consequences. This project seeks to fill these gaps. Broader Impact As the first comprehensive study of the power-sharing agreements that have been struck in state legislatures undergoing partisan ties, this research may shed some light on features of those agreements that .work. and others that have been less effective, in the view of the participants (state legislators and staff) themselves.