Collaborative Research: Strategic Redistricting and Its Political Consequences

这项合作研究关注于了解重新划分选区对立法选举的影响。标准看法认为，重新划分选区对选举的影响微乎其微；在党派利益方面产生微小变化，或者对保护在职者几乎没有作用。虽然已经对这个问题进行了大量的研究，但研究人员认为，之前的工作没有正确地模拟这种影响。使用战略重新划分的正式模型，私人投资指数表明，从州立法者到州法官的各种行为者对如何划定重新划分选区界线具有重要影响。虽然这是众所周知的，但他们也表明了他们的战略行为在什么情况下会对党派收益和在任优势产生影响。研究人员通过考察20世纪60年代S时期发生的一系列重新划分选区的变化来测试他们模型的关键特征。这是美国政治中的一个关键时期，经常与在任优势的崛起联系在一起。研究人员发现，重新划分选区是改变党派优势和保护在职者的重要战略工具。

This collaborative research is concerned with understanding the impact of redistricting on legislative elections. The standard wisdom holds that redistricting has only a minimal effect on elections; producing tiny changes in partisan gain or doing little to protect incumbents. While a great deal of research has been undertaken on this problem, the researchers argue that previous work has improperly modeled the effects. Using a formal model of strategic redistricting, the PIs show that a variety of actors, ranging from state legislators to state judges have important effects on how redistricting lines are drawn. While this is well known, they also show the conditions under when their strategic behavior will have an impact on partisan gains and incumbent advantage. The researchers test crucial features of their model by examining the array of redistricting changes that occurred in the 1960's. This was a key period in American politics and has often been associated with the rise of an incumbency advantage. The researchers find that redistricting is an important strategic tool to change partisan advantage and to protect incumbents.