Collaborative Research on How Nominators Affect Government Formation

在议会和半总统制政权中，总理在组建和协调政府方面发挥核心作用。因此，构成英超竞争的规则非常重要。尽管以下描述并不完全适用于所有情况，但考虑到选举后总理选举的三个阶段是有帮助的：(1)提名阶段，在这一阶段中，宪法规定的行为者--我们通常将其称为“提名人”--选择一位政府提名人选，通常是假定的总理；(2)谈判阶段，提名人选试图组建政府；以及(3)批准阶段，在这一阶段，议会要么明确批准提名的总理和政府(通过任命投票)，要么含蓄地接受他或她的政府(通过不信任投票)。关于第二个(谈判)阶段，我们注意到被任命为格式专家有两个好处：第一，格式专家通常会成为总理；第二，格式专家可能会以额外内阁组合的形式为他的政党争取奖金(参见。Baron和Ferejohn，1989)。作为成为总理和/或获得其他理想投资组合的中间步骤，成为格式专家的重要性意味着提名者的选择(在第一阶段)很重要。无论他们的正式立场如何，提名者在两个关键方面存在差异：(A)他们的党派偏好有多明确；(B)他们的选择(谁将是正式提名人)受到宪法规则和规范的多大限制。投资促进机构打算收集所有议会和半总统民主国家从1990年至今的整个政府组建过程的数据。这些数据包括但不限于：(1)提名人的党派关系；(2)提名人面临的宪法限制；(3)提名人面临的政治机会(主要由政党和联盟系统的分裂决定)；(4)第一位被任命的候选人、第二位、第三位等等；(5)内阁组合和其他职位(如委员会主席)在不同政党之间的分配；(6)政党就其组建政府的联盟意图发表的任何公开声明。然后将继续分析(1)提名人是否更有可能任命自己政党的成员为提名人；(2)提名人是否能为其政党在内阁投资组合中获得红利份额；(3)提名人何时以及为什么能够在内阁投资组合中获得红利份额；以及(4)提名者的预期效应如何影响选举前联盟的形成和/或合并以形成更大的政党。该项目的智力价值在于它澄清了在议会和半总统制度下构建政府的谈判过程，特别强调了党派提名人的作用。该项目的更广泛影响包括为政治改革者的决策提供一些基础，这些改革者最近在许多国家集中关注重新设计政府组建过程或政党制度。

In parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, prime ministers play a central role in forming and coordinating governments. The rules that structure competition for the premiership are thus of great importance. Although the following characterization does not fit all cases equally well, it is helpful to think of there being three post-electoral stages in the election of a premier: (1) a nomination stage, in which a constitutionally stipulated actor-whom we shall generically call the "nominator"-chooses a government formateur, typically the presumptive prime minister; (2) a negotiation stage, in which the formateur attempts to form a government; and (3) a ratification stage, in which the assembly either explicitly approves the proposed premier and government (via an investiture vote) or implicitly accepts his or her government (via the failure to pass a no-confidence vote). Regarding the second (negotiation) stage, we note two advantages of being appointed as formateur: first, the formateur typically becomes the prime minister; second, the formateur may secure a bonus for his party, in the form of additional cabinet portfolios (cf. Baron and Ferejohn 1989). The importance of becoming formateur, as an intermediate step to becoming premier and/or securing other desirable portfolios, means that the nominator's choice (in the first stage) is important.The "nominator" is usually a monarch or a president. Whatever their formal positions, nominators differ along two key dimensions: (a) how clear their partisan preferences are; and (b) how constrained their choice (of who will be formateur) is by constitutional rules and norms. The PIs intend to collect data on the entire government formation process in all parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies from 1990-present. The data include but are not limited to: (1) the partisan affiliation of the nominator; (2) the constitutional constraints the nominator faces; (3) the political opportunities the nominator faces (largely determined by the fragmentation of the party and alliance system); (4) the first appointed formateur, second, third, and so on; (5) the allocation of cabinet portfolios and other offices (e.g., committee chairs) among the various parties; (6) any public announcements made by parties regarding their coalitional intentions in forming a government. Analysis will then proceed of (1) whether nominators are more likely appoint members of their own party as formateur; (2) whether nominators can secure for their parties a bonus share of cabinet portfolios; (3) when and why formateurs are able to secure a bonus share of cabinet portfolios; and (4) how anticipation of nominator effects influences the formation of pre-election alliances and/or mergers to form larger parties.The intellectual merit of the project lies in its clarification of the bargaining process that structures government formation in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, especially highlighting the role of partisan nominators. The broader impact of the project include providing some basis for decisions by political reformers, who in many countries recently have been centrally concerned with re-engineering the government formation process or the party system.