Collaborative Research on Adjustment Costs and Information in Aggregate Fluctuations

总量波动中调整成本与信息的协同研究

• 批准号: 9111094
• 负责人: John Leahy
• 金额: $ 10.77万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-09-01 至 1994-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9111094&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Adjustment; Costs; Information

This project studies the aggregate consequences of the interaction between the adjustment costs faced by individual agents and the transmission of information in the economy. Adjustment costs provide a natural reason for information to be imperfect in a multi-agent economy. When action is costly, individuals will not find it in their interests to respond to every change in their circumstances, thereby preventing the transmission of individually held information to others through market data. In turn, the information problem creates a reason why, even in a competitive setting, equilibrium may be suboptimal. When individuals weigh the costs and benefits of action, they ignore the value to others of the information revealed by their action. The goal of this study is to show that the extent of our ignorance can play a key role in determining both the average level of business activity and the pattern of fluctuations. To accomplish this task many difficult modelling problems, such as aggregation in the face of adjustment costs and the partial revelation of information in general equilibrium models, must be solved. A preliminary theoretical model which overcomes many of the difficult modelling problems and allows a complete analysis of the steady state interactions between information and adjustment costs was completed. Non-steady state extensions in which the importance of information dynamics is readily appreciated will be developed. The idea that information may only be released through action and that adjustment costs limit action has important consequences for economic fluctuations. In particular, the interaction of information and adjustment costs may result in the bunching of individual decisions. The failure of others to act may lead all agents to hesitate, while action by others may promote responses. This may lead to increased market volatility. This study takes us down the path to a better understanding of possible causes and consequences of incomplete information on the behavior of the economy.

该项目研究个体代理人面临的调整成本与经济中的信息传递之间相互作用的综合后果。在多主体经济中，调整成本为信息不完善提供了一个自然原因。当行动代价高昂时，个人将发现对其环境的每一次变化做出反应都不符合他们的利益，从而阻止通过市场数据将个人持有的信息传递给其他人。反过来，信息问题创造了一个理由，为什么即使在竞争环境中，均衡也可能是次优的。当个人权衡行动的成本和收益时，他们忽视了他们的行动所揭示的信息对他人的价值。这项研究的目的是表明，我们的无知程度可以在决定商业活动的平均水平和波动模式方面发挥关键作用。为了完成这一任务，必须解决许多困难的建模问题，如面对调整成本的聚集和一般均衡模型中的部分信息披露。一个初步的理论模型已经完成，该模型克服了许多困难的建模问题，并允许对信息和调整成本之间的稳态相互作用进行完整的分析。将开发其中信息动力学的重要性容易被认识到的非稳态扩展。信息只能通过行动发布，调整成本限制了行动，这种想法对经济波动具有重要影响。特别是，信息和调整成本的相互作用可能会导致个别决策的集中。其他人不采取行动可能会导致所有代理人犹豫不决，而其他人的行动可能会促进反应。这可能导致市场波动加剧。这项研究让我们更好地理解了有关经济行为的不完全信息的可能原因和后果。