Using National Economic Power to Pursue Economic and Environmental Goals

对贸易政策的经济分析通常试图从国内目标的角度来解释贸易干预。例如，关税和配额主要被视为对保护主义压力的回应，这些压力直接来自那些认为自己从中受益的国内集团。但贸易政策越来越被视为执行国际经济和环境协议的机制。例如，贸易制裁被威胁为执行国际债务合同和惩罚违反国际环境议定书的国家的一种手段。这个项目严格分析了国家政府使用贸易政策作为影响其他主权国家政策的一种方式的能力。在动态战略互动理论的背景下，研究了政府施加外部影响的能力。重点不在于发展理论方法本身，而在于将其应用于国际经济秩序。该项目评估现有的多边和单边安排，如关贸总协定和美国贸易法，以及实现全球环境保护、贸易政策、保护知识产权和国际银行业务目标的其他安排的能力。本文提出了两个具体问题：(1)从降低灵活性的角度来看，限制行政部门追求外交政策的法律的成本是否超过了这些法律可能赋予的对外国政府的改善承诺？(2)在关于国家和全球环境保护成本和收益的信息不对称的情况下，国家环境保护应该得到奖励，还是应该对污染者施加制裁？

Economic analysis of trade policy has usually sought to explain trade intervention in terms of domestic objectives. Tariffs and quotas, for example, have been seen primarily as a response to protectionist pressures emerging directly from domestic groups perceiving themselves as benefiting from them. But trade policy is increasingly seen as a mechanism for enforcing international economic and environmental agreements. For example, trade sanctions have been threatened as a means of enforcing international debt contracts and punishing nations that violate international environmental protocols. This project rigorously analyzes the ability of national governments to use trade policy as a way of influencing the policies of other sovereign nations. The ability of a government to exert external influence is investigated in the context of theories of dynamic strategic interaction. The focus is not on the development of theoretical methods per se, but on their application to the international economic order. The project assesses the ability of existing multilateral and unilateral arrangements, such as GATT and U.S. trade law, and alternative arrangements to achieve objectives in global environmental protection, trade policy, protection of intellectual property, and international banking. Two specific questions are addressed: (1) Does the cost, in terms of reduced flexibility, of laws constraining the executive's pursuit of foreign policy outweigh any improved commitment vis-a-vis foreign governments that such laws might impart? (2) In the presence of asymmetric information about the national and global costs and benefits of environmental protection, should national environmental protection be rewarded, or should sanctions be imposed against polluters?