Using National Economic Power to Pursue Economic and Environmental Goals

利用国家经济实力实现经济和环境目标

• 批准号: 9111647
• 负责人: Jonathan Eaton
• 金额: $ 13.05万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-08-01 至 1994-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9111647&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Using; National; Economic; Power; Pursue

Economic analysis of trade policy has usually sought to explain trade intervention in terms of domestic objectives. Tariffs and quotas, for example, have been seen primarily as a response to protectionist pressures emerging directly from domestic groups perceiving themselves as benefiting from them. But trade policy is increasingly seen as a mechanism for enforcing international economic and environmental agreements. For example, trade sanctions have been threatened as a means of enforcing international debt contracts and punishing nations that violate international environmental protocols. This project rigorously analyzes the ability of national governments to use trade policy as a way of influencing the policies of other sovereign nations. The ability of a government to exert external influence is investigated in the context of theories of dynamic strategic interaction. The focus is not on the development of theoretical methods per se, but on their application to the international economic order. The project assesses the ability of existing multilateral and unilateral arrangements, such as GATT and U.S. trade law, and alternative arrangements to achieve objectives in global environmental protection, trade policy, protection of intellectual property, and international banking. Two specific questions are addressed: (1) Does the cost, in terms of reduced flexibility, of laws constraining the executive's pursuit of foreign policy outweigh any improved commitment vis-a-vis foreign governments that such laws might impart? (2) In the presence of asymmetric information about the national and global costs and benefits of environmental protection, should national environmental protection be rewarded, or should sanctions be imposed against polluters?

对贸易政策的经济分析通常试图解释 从国内目标来看，贸易干预。 关税和 例如，配额主要被视为对以下问题的回应： 直接来自国内集团的保护主义压力 认为自己从中受益。 但贸易政策 越来越多地被视为一种机制， 经济和环境协议。 例如贸易 制裁被威胁作为一种强制手段， 国际债务合同和惩罚违反的国家 国际环境协议。 该项目严格 分析各国政府利用贸易政策的能力 以此来影响其他主权国家的政策 政府施加外部影响的能力是 在动态战略理论的背景下研究 互动 重点不在于理论的发展 方法本身，但其适用于国际 经济秩序。 该项目评估了现有的 多边和单边安排，如关贸总协定和美国 贸易法，以及为实现 全球环境保护，贸易政策，保护 知识产权和国际银行业务。 两个具体 问题是：（1）成本是否降低， 灵活性，法律约束行政机关的追求， 外交政策胜过任何改善对外承诺 这些法律可能会影响政府？ (2)存在下 关于国家和全球成本的信息不对称， 环境保护的好处，应国家 环境保护应该受到奖励，还是应该受到制裁？ 对污染者？