Theories of International Financial Institutions

国际金融机构理论

• 批准号: 8708500
• 负责人: Jonathan Eaton
• 金额: $ 5.37万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-07-01 至 1989-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8708500&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Theories; International; Financial; Institutions

This is an exciting and timely project on international financial institutions. The project continues to develop a general theory of international financial institutions as a response to the imperfect ability of contracting agents to enforce international agreements. This theory provides new insights into such important issues as the international debt crisis. The investigator's past work in this and related areas is responsible for a number of valuable insights into international finance. He is capable of continuing this research. The limited incentive to enforce agreements with foreign agents constitutes a significant imperfection in world capital markets. Various institutions that are engaged in the international transfer of resources have emerged as a partial response to this imperfection. Banks, multinational corporations, and reserve and vehicle currencies are three examples. The contribution of this project comes in developing a general theory for these institutions. In particular, the reputations of these institutions may allow their equity owners (or central banks, in the case of reserve currencies) to enter into contracts that are self-enforcing. The reputation of a private bank, may allow it to make credible commitments to repay deposits and to penalize borrowers in default. A multinational corporation may be able to enter into long-term relationships with creditors and employees, and to provide a more efficient level of product quality than would be possible for an anonymous individual agent. Finally, some governments may more credibly promise to desist from imposing the inflation tax than others. The ability of particular national economies to support institutions capable of undertaking these tasks can be related to fundamental aspects of their dynamic behavior derived from intertemporal preferences and technologies.

这是一个令人兴奋和及时的国际金融机构项目。该项目继续发展国际金融机构的一般理论，作为对缔约代理人执行国际协定的能力不完善的回应。这一理论为国际债务危机等重要问题提供了新的见解。该研究员过去在这一领域和相关领域的工作负责对国际金融的一些有价值的见解。他有能力继续这项研究。执行与外国代理人的协议的有限动机构成了世界资本市场的一个重大缺陷。作为对这种不完善的部分反应，已经出现了从事国际资源转让的各种机构。银行、跨国公司、储备货币和工具货币就是三个例子。这个项目的贡献在于为这些机构发展了一个一般的理论。特别是，这些机构的声誉可能允许其股权所有者（或储备货币的央行）签订自我执行的合同。私人银行的声誉可能使其能够作出可信的承诺，偿还存款，并惩罚违约的借款人。跨国公司也许能够与债权人和雇员建立长期关系，并提供比匿名个人代理人可能提供的更有效的产品质量。最后，一些政府可能会比其他政府更可信地承诺不再征收通胀税。特定国家经济支持有能力承担这些任务的机构的能力可能与它们源于跨期偏好和技术的动态行为的基本方面有关。