Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games

这项研究旨在更多地了解协调是如何 问题就解决了 这种分析部分是出于一种愿望 去理解那些令人震惊的、持续存在的歧视模式， 在最近的一些协调中观察到的纳什均衡中， 实验;这些模式随着数量的系统变化 参与者和收益函数，以一种 用传统的均衡修正来解释。 基本 研究的前提是，由于参与者的协调 游戏通常不确定其他玩家会如何反应 他们的均衡的多样性，学习经验， 重复播放很可能在决定 结果。 第一步是制定一个现实的，但听话的 学习过程的模型，该模型显示了 玩家的信念与学习相互作用，使用其含义 对于限制结果的概率分布（通常 基本协调博弈的均衡之一）， 解释观察到的歧视模式。 最终目标 是更普遍地了解参与者的数量， 他们之间的互动，他们的收益是如何确定的， 沟通的机会会影响协调结果。

This research is directed at learning more about how coordination problems are solved. The analysis is motivated in part by a desire to understand the striking, persistent patterns of discrimination among Nash equilibria observed in some recent coordination experiments; these patterns varied systematically with the number of players and the payoff function, in ways that cannot be explained by traditional equilibrium refinements. The basic premise of the research is that, because players in coordination games are normally uncertain about how other players will respond to their multiplicity of equilibria, learning from experience in repeated play is likely to play a decisive role in determining outcomes. The first step is to develop a realistic but tractable model of the learning process that shows how the dispersion of players' beliefs interacts with learning, using its implications for the probability distribution of the limiting outcome (normally one of the equilibria of the underlying coordination game) to explain the observed patterns of discrimination. The ultimate goal is to understand more generally how the number of players, the ways in which they interact, how their payoffs are determined, and their opportunities to communicate influence coordination outcomes.