Game-Theoretic, Evolutionary, and Adaptive Approaches to Coordination

这个项目旨在了解如何解决协调问题。它使用互补博弈论、进化和自适应技术来研究协调的历史模型。大多数研究都致力于详细分析群体在反复进行协调博弈时的策略选择动态，并根据他们的经验以合理但不一定合理的方式调整他们的策略。该项目侧重于进化博弈结构的模型，以及特定的、简单的协调博弈，选择这些模型既要考虑它们的经济利益，也要考虑实验证据的可用性。进化方法在研究协调方面具有重要的比较优势，为自适应模型的建立提供了良好的基础。这项研究的最终目标是了解群体规模、玩家的回报对彼此决策的敏感性以及玩家的交流机会如何影响他们协调决策的程度。协调问题是经济学中许多重要问题的核心。这包括设计最优激励方案；在长期关系中，哪些结果可以由内隐契约支持；以及决定谈判者是否以及如何分享达成协议后的盈余。本项目对协调问题的分析工具和见解对这一研究领域作出了宝贵的贡献。他们的贡献包括提供比标准技术更有说服力的协调博弈行为特征的新理论。例如，协调实验表明，有些行为规律无法用正统博弈论解释，但可以用本项目开发的模型类型来解释。

This project is directed at understanding how coordination problems are solved. It uses complementary game-theoretic, evolutionary, and adaptive techniques to study historical models of coordination. Most of the research is devoted to a detailed analysis of the dynamics of strategy choices in populations repeatedly playing coordination games and adjusting their strategies in response to their experience in plausible, but not necessarily rational ways. The project focuses on models with the structure of evolutionary games, and on specific, simple coordination games, chosen both for their economic interest and for the availability of experimental evidence. The evolutionary approach has important comparative advantages in studying coordination, and provides a good foundation for adaptive models. The ultimate goal of this research is to understand how group size, the sensitivity of players' payoffs to each other's decisions, and player's opportunities to communicate interact to determine how well they coordinate their decisions. Coordination problems lie at the heart of many important questions in economics. These include the design of optimal incentive schemes; the characterization of which outcomes can be supported by implicit contract in a long-term relationship; and the determination of whether, and how, bargainers share the surplus from making an agreement. The analytic tools and insights into coordination problems from this project make a valuable contribution to this area of research. The contribution consists of new theories that provide more convincing characterizations of behavior in coordination games than standard techniques. For example, coordination experiments show that there are behavioral regularities that can not be explained by orthodox game theory but can be explained by the type of models developed in this project.