Game-Theoretic, Evolutionary, and Adaptive Approaches to Coordination

该项目旨在了解协调问题如何 都解决了 它使用互补的博弈论，进化论， 和自适应技术来研究协调的历史模型。 大多数研究都致力于详细分析 重复博弈种群策略选择的动态 协调博弈并调整策略， 他们的经验在似是而非，但不一定理性的方式。 该项目的重点是具有进化结构的模型 游戏，并在特定的，简单的协调游戏，选择两者都为 他们的经济利益和实验的可用性 证据 进化方法具有重要的比较 在学习协调方面具有优势，并提供了良好的基础 适应性模型。 这项研究的最终目的是 了解群体规模，参与者收益的敏感性， 彼此的决定，以及玩家交流的机会 互动以确定他们如何协调他们的决定。 协调问题是许多重要问题的核心 在经济学上。 其中包括最优激励的设计 计划;可以支持哪些成果的特征 在长期关系中的隐性合同;以及 确定议价者是否以及如何分享盈余 达成协议 分析工具和见解， 这个项目的协调问题， 对这一研究领域的贡献。 贡献包括 新的理论提供了更令人信服的特征， 在协调游戏中的行为比标准技术。 为 例如，协调实验表明， 这是传统博弈论无法解释的， 可以通过本项目中开发的模型类型来解释。

This project is directed at understanding how coordination problems are solved. It uses complementary game-theoretic, evolutionary, and adaptive techniques to study historical models of coordination. Most of the research is devoted to a detailed analysis of the dynamics of strategy choices in populations repeatedly playing coordination games and adjusting their strategies in response to their experience in plausible, but not necessarily rational ways. The project focuses on models with the structure of evolutionary games, and on specific, simple coordination games, chosen both for their economic interest and for the availability of experimental evidence. The evolutionary approach has important comparative advantages in studying coordination, and provides a good foundation for adaptive models. The ultimate goal of this research is to understand how group size, the sensitivity of players' payoffs to each other's decisions, and player's opportunities to communicate interact to determine how well they coordinate their decisions. Coordination problems lie at the heart of many important questions in economics. These include the design of optimal incentive schemes; the characterization of which outcomes can be supported by implicit contract in a long-term relationship; and the determination of whether, and how, bargainers share the surplus from making an agreement. The analytic tools and insights into coordination problems from this project make a valuable contribution to this area of research. The contribution consists of new theories that provide more convincing characterizations of behavior in coordination games than standard techniques. For example, coordination experiments show that there are behavioral regularities that can not be explained by orthodox game theory but can be explained by the type of models developed in this project.