Bargaining in Long-Term Economic Relationships

长期经济关系中的讨价还价

• 批准号: 8703337
• 负责人: Vincent Crawford
• 金额: $ 6.46万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-07-15 至 1989-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8703337&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Bargaining; Long; Term; Economic; Relationships

This project contributes to our understanding of the way economic agents communicate and coordinate in bargaining. It also develops a new bargaining model which can explain both the duration of negotiations that end without strikes and the frequency and duration of strikes. The research builds on the impressive past contributions of the investigator. The first part of the project is a theoretical investigation of how agents learn how to cooperate in repeated coordination games with complete information. These games allow a clearer characterization of what rationality means in the presence of multiple equilibria, and present the problem of learning how to cooperate in its purest form. The project studies how agents' optimal strategies depend on whether they begin with a common language in which to describe their actions and/or their positions in the game to each other. This research helps explain how social conventions evolve. It clarifies the concept of a rational response to multiple-equilibrium problems. The second part uses dynamic bargaining models to explain the timing and duration of strikes. Such models typically posit private information for one bargainer, and rely on differences in the costs of delaying agreement among his types to sort them in equilibrium. The project develops a bargaining model in which production usually proceeds during contract negotiations, and calling a strike requires an overt action by the union, with consequences vastly different from failing to accept the firm's last offer. Striking increases delay costs for both bargainers, and may also entail sunk costs.

该项目有助于我们理解经济主体在讨价还价中沟通和协调的方式。 它还开发了一种新的谈判模型，可以解释没有罢工的谈判的持续时间以及罢工的频率和持续时间。 这项研究建立在研究者过去令人印象深刻的贡献的基础上。 该项目的第一部分是对智能体如何学习如何在具有完整信息的重复协调博弈中进行合作的理论研究。 这些游戏可以更清晰地描述在存在多重均衡的情况下理性意味着什么，并提出了学习如何以最纯粹的形式进行合作的问题。 该项目研究智能体的最佳策略如何取决于他们是否以共同语言开始，以向彼此描述他们的行为和/或他们在游戏中的位置。 这项研究有助于解释社会习俗如何演变。 它阐明了理性应对多重均衡问题的概念。 第二部分使用动态讨价还价模型来解释罢工的时机和持续时间。 这些模型通常为一个讨价还价者设定私人信息，并依靠其类型之间延迟达成协议的成本差异来对它们进行均衡排序。 该项目开发了一种讨价还价模式，其中生产通常在合同谈判期间进行，而罢工需要工会采取公开行动，其后果与不接受公司最后的报价有很大不同。 罢工会增加双方讨价还价的延迟成本，还可能带来沉没成本。