Collaborative Research in Experimental Studies of Auctions and Markets with Asymmetric Information

信息不对称拍卖与市场实验研究中的协作研究

• 批准号: 8921428
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 2.57万
• 依托单位: University of Houston
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-03-01 至 1992-02-29
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8921428&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Experimental; Studies; Auctions

This project extends and completes experimental investigations of English common value auctions, common value auctions with asymmetric (insider) information, and learning processes in experimental auction markets. The project also finishes a case study of the bidding process in the Houston construction industry. Under the previous NSF grant the investigators found conclusive evidence of a "winner's curse" (winning bidders suffer losses) in English auctions. This is an important result methodologically because it contradicts existing theories of bidding and it is important substantively since the English common value auction is a widely used mechanism for auctions. The experiments employed an English clock procedure whereby prices start at the lowest possible value for the item and increase steadily. Bidders are active until they signal their intention to drop out of the auction, which decision is irrevocable for the sale of that item. The last active bidder wins the item, paying the price at which the next to last bidder dropped out. The experiments demonstrated that the dropout prices of losing bidders reveal information to the other bidders and reduce but do not eliminate the winner's curse. Further research should provide new and useful insights into institutions and practices that mitigate or eliminate entirely the winner's curse in auctions. The case study of the construction industry in Houston is especially interesting. In order to determine the generalizability of the auction market findings, the investigators conducted a series of low price, common value offer auctions in comparing the performance of student subjects with experienced professionals from the Houston construction industry. Qualitatively similar behavior was found across subject pools as in both cases bidders suffered from the winner's curse, losing money as a consequence of winning the item, and increasing the number of bidders exacerbated the losses. These results raised an important question: Why are business executives successful in real world auctions and unsuccessful in laboratory auctions? The case study identifies a number of real world institutional features and practices that reduce the effects of the winner's curse.

该项目扩展并完成了以下实验研究： 英国共同价值拍卖，共同价值拍卖， 不对称（内部）信息，以及 实验拍卖市场 该项目还完成了一个案例 休斯顿工程投标过程研究 行业 根据之前的NSF拨款，研究人员发现， “赢家诅咒”的确凿证据（中标者遭受 在英国拍卖中的损失。 这是一个重要的结果 因为它违背了现有的理论， 投标，这是重要的实质性，因为英语 共同价值拍卖是一种广泛使用的拍卖机制。 实验采用英国时钟程序， 价格从物品的最低可能价值开始， 稳步增长。 投标人是积极的，直到他们的信号， 有意退出拍卖，该决定是 不可撤销的销售该项目。 最后一个活跃的投标人 赢得物品，支付倒数第二个出价者的价格 退学了 实验表明， 失败的投标人的价格向其他投标人透露了信息 减少但不能消除赢家的诅咒。 进一步 研究应提供新的和有益的见解机构 和做法，减轻或消除完全赢家的 拍卖中的诅咒 休斯顿建筑业的案例研究是 特别有趣 为了确定 拍卖市场调查结果的普遍性， 调查人员进行了一系列的低价，共同价值的报价， 拍卖在比较学生科目的表现， 来自休斯顿建筑行业的专业人士。 在受试者汇总中发现了类似的定性行为， 在这两种情况下，投标人都遭受了赢家的诅咒， 钱作为赢得项目的结果，并增加 投标人的数量加剧了损失。 这些结果提高了 一个重要的问题：为什么企业高管在 真实的世界拍卖和实验室拍卖中的失败？ 的 案例研究确定了一些真实的世界机构 功能和做法，减少赢家的影响， 诅咒.