The Political Economy of International Trade Relations (Accomplishment-Based Renewal)

国际贸易关系的政治经济学（成就型更新）

• 批准号: 9514974
• 负责人: Gene Grossman
• 金额: $ 29.24万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1996
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1996-07-01 至 2000-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9514974&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Political; Economy; International; Trade; Relations

9514974 Grossman This Accomplishment-Based Renewal of the NSF grant entitled "the Political Economy of International Trade Relations" continues the study of the formation of policies that affect international trade. The analytic approach involves formal modeling of the incentives facing politically motivated elected representatives, and the actions taken by special interest groups in pursuit of particularlistic benefits. The ongoing research concentrates in three main areas. First, it examines the dynamics of trade policy in response to a one-shot change in the terms of trade and to recurring shifts in comparative advantage. The analysis incorporates politicians who have short-time horizons and who cannot commit the future course of trade policy. Second, it studies the design of political rules and institutions, both domestic and international, that can promote more efficient trade policy outcomes. Finally, it integrates this work and related research on the political economy of trade policy, in the form of an integrative monograph covering a range of topics and approaches. Recent public debate over trade policy has pitted environmentalists against free trade interests. The previous work by the investigators demonstrated that there is no presumption that trade liberalization will be harmful to the environment. In this project the investigators examine the political economy of the interaction between different policy issues. Suppose that environmentalists expect that environmental standards at home will be looser if trade is freer than if trade barriers protect special interests in the import-competing industries. Then the environmentalists might support protection in order to secure stricter standards and prevent "downward harmonization," even if trade protection is not directly in their own interest.

小行星9514974 这一基于成就的NSF赠款更新题为“国际贸易关系的政治经济学”，继续研究影响国际贸易的政策的形成。 分析方法包括正式建模的激励面临的政治动机的当选代表，并采取行动的特殊利益集团在追求particularistic利益。 正在进行的研究集中在三个主要领域。 首先，它审查了贸易政策对贸易条件的一次性变化和比较优势的反复变化的反应。 该分析纳入了短期视野和无法承诺未来贸易政策方向的政治家。 其次，它研究国内和国际政治规则和制度的设计，以促进更有效的贸易政策成果。 最后，它整合了这项工作和贸易政策的政治经济学的相关研究，在一个综合性的专著，涵盖了一系列的主题和方法的形式。 最近关于贸易政策的公开辩论使环保主义者与自由贸易利益相对立。 调查人员以前的工作表明，没有人假定贸易自由化会对环境有害。 在这个项目中，调查人员研究了不同政策问题之间相互作用的政治经济学。 假设环境保护主义者预期，如果贸易更加自由，国内的环境标准将比贸易壁垒保护进口竞争行业的特殊利益时宽松。 然后，环境保护主义者可能会支持保护，以确保更严格的标准，防止“向下协调”，即使贸易保护并不直接符合他们自己的利益。