Fashion Dynamics, Anonymity in Dynamic Games, and Participation and Efficiency in Voting Games

本研究由三个独立的部分组成。第一部分是运用动态博弈论分析产品设计创新和时尚周期。将开发一个时尚周期模型，其中时尚被用作交配游戏中的信号装置。设计师可以创造出耐用的设计商品，这些商品被消费者用来暗示和筛选潜在的合作伙伴。在这种情况下，价格和创新，时尚的扩散和炫耀性消费行为将被检查。项目的第二部分关注的是动态博弈中存在大量有限玩家和连续玩家时均衡结果的比较。第三部分分析了在选民信息不相同的情况下，两种候选人选举的参与和投票行为。将审查选民弃权的条件。此外，还将分析选举作为一种收集信息的机制的效率，以及选举结果偏向少数人的条件。

This research consists of three separate parts. The first involves the analysis of product design innovation and fashion cycles using dynamic game theory. A model of the fashion cycle will be developed in which fashion is used as a signaling device in a mating game. Designers can create durable design commodities which are used by consumers to signal and to screen prospective partners. In this context price and innovation, diffusion of fashion, and conspicuous consumption behavior will be examined. The second part of the project focuses on the comparison of equilibrium outcomes in dynamic games when there are a large finite number of players and when there are a continuum of players. The third part involves analyzing the participation and voting behavior in two candidate elections when voters do not have the same information. The conditions under which voters will abstain form voting will be examined. In addition, the efficiency of elections as a mechanism to aggregate information will be analyzed, as well as conditions under which election outcomes are biased in favor of a minority.