Fashion Dynamics, Anonymity in Dynamic Games, and Participation and Efficiency in Voting Games

时尚动态、动态游戏的匿名性、投票游戏的参与度和效率

• 批准号: 9409180
• 负责人: Wolfgang Pesendorfer
• 金额: $ 8.8万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-10-15 至 1997-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9409180&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Fashion; Dynamics; Anonymity; Dynamic; Games

This research consists of three separate parts. The first involves the analysis of product design innovation and fashion cycles using dynamic game theory. A model of the fashion cycle will be developed in which fashion is used as a signaling device in a mating game. Designers can create durable design commodities which are used by consumers to signal and to screen prospective partners. In this context price and innovation, diffusion of fashion, and conspicuous consumption behavior will be examined. The second part of the project focuses on the comparison of equilibrium outcomes in dynamic games when there are a large finite number of players and when there are a continuum of players. The third part involves analyzing the participation and voting behavior in two candidate elections when voters do not have the same information. The conditions under which voters will abstain form voting will be examined. In addition, the efficiency of elections as a mechanism to aggregate information will be analyzed, as well as conditions under which election outcomes are biased in favor of a minority.

本研究分为三个部分。 第一部分是运用动态博弈理论对产品设计创新和流行周期进行分析。 将开发一个时尚周期模型，其中时尚被用作交配游戏中的信号装置。 设计师可以创造出耐用的设计商品，消费者可以利用这些商品来发出信号，并筛选潜在的合作伙伴。 在这种背景下，价格和创新，时尚的传播，和炫耀性消费行为将被审查。 该项目的第二部分侧重于动态博弈的均衡结果的比较时，有一个大的有限数量的球员，当有一个连续的球员。 第三部分分析了选民在信息不完全一致的情况下，在两次候选人选举中的参与和投票行为。 将审查选民弃权的条件。 此外，还将分析选举作为一种汇总信息的机制的效率，以及选举结果偏向少数人的条件。