Information Aggregation in Bayesian Games with many Players

多玩家贝叶斯博弈中的信息聚合

• 批准号: 9617735
• 负责人: Wolfgang Pesendorfer
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-07-01 至 1998-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9617735&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Information; Aggregation; Bayesian; Games; many

Project Abstract In this project the principal investigator conducts theoretical research on the welfare and information aggregation properties of market institutions (exemplified by auctions and double auctions), elections, and related institutions. A common feature of these institutions is that they involve the interaction of a large number of agents. Whether large markets effectively aggregate decentralized private information is one of the central questions in economic theory. This project analyzes this question for auctions, double auctions and related environments. The advantage of the auction setting is that it provides an explicit model of how individual actions and information translate into prices. This is in contrast to the price-taking model of a competitive market that is characterized by equilibrium conditions on prices, but provides no explanation of how prices satisfying those conditions are arrived at. The findings define conditions (necessary and sufficient) on the structure of the market that lead to `full information equivalence` . Full information equivalence is satisfied if the equilibrium price is the same whether or not buyers or sellers have private information about the quality of the objects for sale. The question of whether elections effectively aggregate private information is central to political theory. A strong argument for elections is that society may be collectively better informed about the relative quality of a set of alternatives than any individual. Elections provide a mechanism for aggregating private information, ensuring a better collective decision. This idea inspired some of the earliest mathematical models of voting in elections and dates back at least to Condorcet. The set of environments in which elections might usefully aggregate private information about the relative quality of a pair of alternatives goes well beyond the Jury setting that was the focus of Condorcet's work. In most elections voters have private information about the relative quality of the alternatives. This project characterizes the voting environments that lead to full information equivalence, i.e., situations in which the alternative elected is the same whether or not the private information of voters about the quality of the alternatives is made public before the election. Finally, this project develops an analytical framework that includes both elections and auctions as special cases. Analyzing this more abstract setting promises to provide a deeper understanding of the underlying characteristics that lead to institutions to have good information aggregation properties.

本课题主要研究对象是市场制度（以拍卖和双向拍卖为例）、选举及相关制度的福利性和信息聚合性的理论研究。这些机构的一个共同特点是，它们涉及大量代理人的互动。 大型市场能否有效地聚集分散的私人信息是经济理论的核心问题之一。这个项目分析了这个问题的拍卖，双向拍卖和相关的环境。拍卖设置的优势在于，它提供了一个明确的模型，说明个人行为和信息如何转化为价格。这与竞争市场的定价模型形成对比，后者的特点是价格的均衡条件，但没有解释满足这些条件的价格是如何得出的。调查结果确定了导致“充分信息对等”的市场结构的条件（必要和充分）。如果无论买卖双方是否拥有关于销售对象质量的私人信息，均衡价格都相同，则满足完全信息等价。 选举是否有效地聚集了私人信息的问题是政治理论的核心。选举的一个有力论据是，社会集体可能比任何个人更了解一组替代品的相对质量。选举提供了一种汇集私人信息的机制，确保更好的集体决策。这个想法启发了一些最早的选举投票数学模型，至少可以追溯到孔多塞。一套环境中，选举可能有用的聚合私人信息的相对质量的一对替代品远远超出了陪审团设置，这是孔多塞的工作重点。在大多数选举中，选民对候选人的相对质量有私人信息。该项目的特点，导致充分的信息等效的投票环境，即，无论选民关于备选方案质量的私人信息是否在选举前公开，所选备选方案都是相同的情况。 最后，这个项目开发了一个分析框架，包括选举和拍卖作为特殊情况。分析这种更抽象的设置有望提供更深入的理解，导致机构具有良好的信息聚合属性的基本特征。