Democratic Political Systems and International Conflict Behavior

9511005 Huth在这个项目中，博弈论的方法被用来解释：1)当国家之间出现政治安全问题的国际争端时；2)为什么一些国际争端涉及高水平的外交和军事冲突，而在其他争端中则没有这种冲突；3)国际争端何时通过妥协或单方面让步来解决？假设来源于博弈论模型，然后通过一系列统计分析对1918-1990年间国际争端的历史数据进行系统检验。该项目的理论重点是研究民主政治制度和解决冲突的规范如何影响国家领导人的外交政策决定。关于民主与外交政策之间关系的主张将从外交政策决策的一般模型中得出，该模型将现实主义和最近的国内政治方法的见解整合到国际关系的研究中。＊＊＊

9511005 Huth In this project a game-theoretic approach is used to explain: 1) when international disputes over political-security issues will emerge between states; 2) why some international disputes involve high levels of diplomatic and military conflict whereas in other disputes such conflict is absent; 3) when will international disputes be settled by compromise or unilateral concessions? Hypotheses are derived from a game-theoretic model and then systematically tested against historical data on international disputes between 1918-1990 by a series of statistical analyses. The theoretical focus of the project is to examine how democratic political institutions and norms of conflict resolution affect the foreign policy decisions of state leaders. Propositions on the relationship between democracy and foreign policy will be derived from a general model of foreign policy decision making which integrates insights from both realism and recent domestic politics approaches to the study of international relations. ***