Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Civil-Military Bargaining, the Threat of War, and the Path to Civilian Control

政治学博士论文研究：军民谈判、战争威胁和文官控制之路

• 批准号: 1424001
• 负责人: Paul Huth
• 金额: $ 1.86万
• 依托单位: University of Maryland, College Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-09-01 至 2015-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1424001&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

When do militaries withdraw from politics and submit to civilian control? This is a vital question given that civilian control of politically passive militaries is a prerequisite for democratization and is also strongly associated with international and domestic peace. This project examines the effects of international and domestic conflict on the military's role in politics in non-democracies and states transitioning to democracy. It argues that conflicts that threaten to topple a state's leader increase military intrusion into politics, while conflicts that do not pose the same risk exacerbate splits in the military's officer corps and decrease military involvement in politics. While previous studies use proxy measures to capture different aspects of civil-military relations, this project will use a new cross-national dataset on military intrusion into politics and relative civilian control. The scope of the study is all non-democracies and states transitioning to democracy from 1960 to the present. Accordingly, the project will provide new insight into the civil-military relations of such states as China, Russia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Thailand, and Iraq. Intellectual Merit: This project provides an answer to the puzzle of civil-military relations: It is the degree to which the state leader is threatened that matters it military intrusion. State leaders can leverage domestic or international threats that do not directly endanger their rule to exacerbate intra-military tensions and to compel the military to withdraw from politics. However, conflicts that pose a more severe threat to the leader weaken that leader's position, given their need for military protection. This leads to military intrusion into politics and weaker civilian control. The testing of this theory will rest heavily on novel, cross-national data collection on the role of the military in politics. Preliminary analysis in the proposal using extant data on military control of ministries of defense (MODs) for a limited number of years provides initial support for the theory, but this project proposes to conduct tests using a much-expanded dataset that covers 1960 to the present and captures much deeper aspects of states' civil-military relations. These data will include not only military control of the MOD, but also military representation in national cabinets, intelligence agency leadership positions, and national security councils. These objective measures map much more closely onto the concepts of civilian control and the military's political role than existing data and can, thus, allow for truer tests of theories that incorporate civil-military relations as either dependent or independent variables. Broader Impacts: This project provides a broader impact on society in two ways: by addressing a pressing national security dilemma for U.S. policy-makers, and by generating a dataset which will be useful to scholars addressing a wide range of policy questions. First, the events of the Arab Spring have demonstrated the importance of the military as a political actor-with the military asserting a political role for itself in some cases, but in others, stepping back and allowing democratization to proceed. This project will generate and test a theory that provides a framework for policy-makers to predict military intrusion into politics in a range of states, including those undergoing democratic transitions. This will allow policy-makers to more accurately assess the prospects for democracy to take hold in such states.Further, this project will generate clear predictions about the effect of a state's security environment on the propensity of its military to take a political role. Accordingly, given the ability of the United States to affect other countries' security environment through troop deployments, military aid, and military cooperation agreements, this study has clear relevance to U.S. policy-makers interested in reducing military intrusion into politics in recipient countries.Secondly, the data generated by this project will have broad applicability beyond testing the theory outlined here. This data could be used by scholars to address such questions as the relationship between civil-military conflict and states' tendency to get involved in international crises and the propensity for crises with states with poor civil-military relations to escalate to war-questions that directly relate, for example, to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia crisis.

军队何时退出政治并服从文官控制？这是一个至关重要的问题，因为文官控制政治上被动的军队是民主化的先决条件，也与国际和国内和平密切相关。该项目研究了国际和国内冲突对非民主国家和向民主过渡的国家的军事政治作用的影响。它认为，有可能推翻一个国家领导人的冲突会增加军队对政治的干预，而不构成同样风险的冲突会加剧军官队伍的分裂，减少军队对政治的参与。虽然以前的研究使用代理措施来捕捉军民关系的不同方面，本项目将使用一个新的跨国数据集军事干预政治和相对的民事控制。研究范围是1960年至今的所有非民主国家和向民主过渡的国家。因此，该项目将为中国、俄罗斯、乌克兰、阿富汗、泰国和伊拉克等国的军民关系提供新的见解。智力优势：这个项目为军民关系之谜提供了一个答案：国家领导人受到威胁的程度与军事入侵有关。国家领导人可以利用不直接危及其统治的国内或国际威胁来加剧军队内部的紧张局势，迫使军队退出政治。然而，对领导人构成更严重威胁的冲突会削弱领导人的地位，因为他们需要军事保护。这导致了军队对政治的干涉和文职控制的削弱。 对这一理论的检验将主要依赖于对军队在政治中作用的新颖的跨国数据收集。初步分析的建议使用现存的数据对国防部（国防部）的军事控制有限的几年提供了初步支持的理论，但该项目建议进行测试使用一个大大扩展的数据集，涵盖1960年至今，并捕捉国家的军民关系的更深层次的方面。这些数据不仅包括国防部的军事控制，还包括国家内阁、情报机构领导职位和国家安全委员会中的军事代表。这些客观的衡量标准比现有数据更能反映文职控制和军队政治作用的概念，因此，可以对将军民关系作为因变量或自变量的理论进行更真实的检验。更广泛的影响：该项目通过两种方式对社会产生更广泛的影响：为美国决策者解决紧迫的国家安全困境，并生成一个数据集，这将有助于学者解决广泛的政策问题。首先，阿拉伯之春的事件表明了军队作为政治参与者的重要性--军队在某些情况下为自己争取政治角色，但在另一些情况下，后退一步，允许民主化进程。该项目将产生和测试一个理论，为决策者提供一个框架，以预测军事入侵政治在一系列国家，包括那些正在进行民主过渡。这将使决策者能够更准确地评估民主在这些国家扎根的前景，此外，该项目还将对一个国家的安全环境对其军队发挥政治作用的倾向的影响做出明确的预测。因此，考虑到美国通过军事部署、军事援助和军事合作协议影响他国安全环境的能力，本研究对于希望减少军事干预受援国政治的美国决策者来说，具有明显的现实意义。其次，本研究所获得的数据，不仅具有检验理论的意义，还具有广泛的适用性。这些数据可以被学者用来解决诸如军民冲突与国家卷入国际危机的倾向之间的关系以及与军民关系不佳的国家的危机升级为战争的倾向等问题-这些问题直接关系到正在进行的乌克兰-俄罗斯危机。