Guerrilla Insurgencies: The International and Domestic Sources of Resource Mobilization and Coercive Bargaining

主要调查人员(PI)对1980-2007年间的游击队叛乱进行了创新的理论和实证研究。这些理论模型既借鉴了国际关系学者提出的战争讨价还价理论，也借鉴了比较政治学者运用的资源动员的集体行动理论。PI使用这些模型来分析国内和国际力量如何在三个连续的阶段影响游击队叛乱。在第一阶段，中心问题是低级别游击队武装冲突是否会升级为大规模内战。在第二阶段，分析的重点是了解游击队和政权之间的强制性谈判模式，在这些模式中，战斗人员选择不同的武装攻击和谈判战略。在这一阶段，人们感兴趣的主要结果包括战争的持续时间、暴力的严重性和目标以及会谈的频率和时机。在第三阶段，私人投资机构分析内战如何通过谈判达成协议、军事胜利或在没有任何和解的情况下降级来结束内战的动态。在这三个阶段中的每个阶段，私人投资机构都利用他们的理论框架，借鉴了IR讨价还价理论和集体行动理论来解释不同的行为模式。和平与和平研究所预计，讨价还价理论对于理解战略互动和联合应对产生的结果特别重要，而集体行动理论将最有助于模拟单个战斗人员的行动和选择如何促进联合结果。他们预计国际因素对游击队叛乱的发起和结束特别重要，而国内因素对叛乱的动态将更加重要。为了检验从他们的战时谈判和集体行动理论中得出的假设，PIs构建了一个原始数据集，该数据集是从1980年至2007年从173名游击队叛乱人口中随机抽取的。通过对新的细粒度数据集的一系列统计分析验证了假设，该项目的结果将对游击叛乱动力学的基础研究、关于冲突的谈判模型和集体行动理论的学术文献做出重要贡献，并开发应该引起其他研究人员广泛兴趣的新数据集。除了对基础研究的贡献外，这个项目的发现应该与美国和海外的政策制定者相关，他们寻求及时干预，以管理和控制其他国家的国内武装冲突。例如，调查结果应有助于政策制定者预测：(1)低水平的内部冲突何时会升级为内战；(2)内战何时会导致人道主义危机和针对平民的大规模暴力；(3)战斗人员是否可能受到外部威胁和制裁的胁迫。

The principal investigators (PIs) use an innovative theoretical and empirical study of guerrilla insurgencies from 1980-2007. The theoretical models draw upon both bargaining theories of war developed by international relations scholars as well as collective action theories of resource mobilization utilized by comparative politics scholars. The PIs use the models to analyze how domestic and international forces influence guerrilla insurgencies across three sequential stages. In the first stage, the central question is whether a low-level guerrilla armed conflicts escalate to large-scale civil war. In the second stage, the analysis focuses on understanding patterns of coercive bargaining between guerrillas and regimes in which combatants choose different strategies of armed attacks and negotiations. In this stage the central outcomes of interest include the duration of the war, the severity and targets of violence, and the frequency and timing of talks. In the third stage the PIs analyze the dynamics of how civil wars come to an end via negotiated agreements, military victories, or de-escalation without any settlements. At each of these three stages, the PIs utilize their theoretical framework that draws upon IR bargaining theory and collective action theory to explain varying patterns of behavior. The PIs expect bargaining theory to be especially important to understanding outcomes resulting from strategic interaction and joint responses, while collective action theory will be most helpful in modeling how the actions and choices of individual combatants contribute to the joint outcomes. They expect international factors to be particularly significant to the initiation and termination of guerrilla insurgencies, while domestic factors will be more important to the dynamics of insurgency.To test the hypotheses derived from their theory of wartime bargaining and collective action, the PIs construct an original data set on a random sample of guerrilla insurgencies drawn from the population of 173 such insurgencies from 1980-2007. The hypotheses are tested through a series of statistical analyses of new fine-grained datasets and the results of the project will make important contributions to basic research on the dynamics of guerrilla insurgencies, scholarly literatures on bargaining models of conflict and collective action theory, and develop new datasets that should be of widespread interest to other researchers. In addition to contributions to basic research, the findings from this project should be of relevance to policymakers in the US and abroad who seek timely interventions to manage and control internal armed conflicts in other states. For example, the findings should help policymakers to anticipate: (1) when low-level internal conflicts will escalate to civil wars, (2) when civil wars will lead to humanitarian crises and large-scale violence against civilian populations, and (3) whether combatants are likely to be coerced by outside threats and sanctions.