Foreign Direct Investment and Antidumping Investigations

9810706布洛尼根随着最新的关贸总协定乌拉圭回合在世界贸易组织国家中削减和取消大多数主要关税和配额，反倾销和反补贴税(反倾销和反补贴税)法律将成为世界经济中仍然存在的最重要的贸易政策。虽然有大量文献研究了反倾销调查和关税对贸易和价格的影响，但很少有人注意到外国直接投资在反倾销调查的发生、管理和影响中的作用。该项目将生成一个数据库，将在美国反兴奋剂调查中被调查的外国公司的外国直接投资发生情况与这些公司收到的特定于公司的关税相匹配。这一新的公司级数据库将能够分析以下以前未探索过的问题，这些问题对AD保护的结构具有明显的政策影响。1)外国公司在多大程度上将生产设在美国以避免反倾销税，美国广告法是否有鼓励或阻止这种关税跃升的特点？跳过关税的反倾销保护的可能性在很大程度上被忽视了，但对国内企业获得的实际“保护”、美国的外国直接投资水平、价格、就业和反倾销保护的福利成本有明显的影响。该项目将在公司层面分析美国反倾销案中外国直接投资跳过关税的程度，以及年度反倾销税审查对外国公司跳过关税的激励的影响。外国公司可以通过停止“倾销”来在未来的年度审查中实现较低的关税。理论和实证工作将决定美国广告法的这一特点在多大程度上阻碍了外国直接投资的关税跳跃。2)在美国设立(或位于)的公司在AD调查中被点名时，会得到与不在美国投资的外国竞争对手不同的结果吗？交换FDI理论表明，外国公司可能会在美国设立办事处，以安抚保护主义情绪，并获得较低的预期未来保护概率。另一方面，Blonigen和Ohno(即将推出)的一项理论结果表明，投资于市场的公司可能会积极出口，以引发反倾销调查，从而对竞争对手征收关税，这些竞争对手不太可能能够跳过关税保护。这两个假设对已经在美国市场投资的外国公司和没有投资的外国公司收到的关税有相反的预测。该项目将评估被投资外国公司对美国广告法的战略反应的程度和性质。3)国内行业在决定是否通过AD保护申请救济时，会在多大程度上考虑外国竞争对手跳过关税的可能性？随意的经验表明，大多数AD案件都是针对来自很少在美国投资的国家的公司。当提到经常在美国进行外国直接投资的国家时，调查的产品往往是在钢铁等固定投资成本相对较高的行业。这个项目将从理论和经验上调查国内行业申请代价高昂的救济的可能性，因为行业和国家在跳过反倾销保护的能力方面存在差异。?？

9810706 Blonigen With the latest GATT Uruguay Round reductions and eliminations of most major tariffs and quotas across World Trade Organization countries, antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws are poised to become the most significant trade policy remaining in the world economy. While a significant body of literature has examined the trade and price effects of AD/CVD investigations and duties, little attention has been given to the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the occurrence, administration and effects of AD investigations. This project will generate a database matching FDI occurrences by foreign firms investigated in U.S. AD investigations to the firm-specific duties received by these firms. This new firm-level database will allow analysis of the following previously-unexplored issues which have obvious policy implications for the structure of AD protection. 1) To what extent do foreign firms locate production in the United States to avoid AD duties and are there features of U.S. AD law that encourage or discourage this tariff- jumping? The possibility of tariff-jumping AD protection has largely been ignored, but has obvious impacts on the actual "protection" the domestic firms receive, FDI levels in the U.S., prices, employment, and welfare costs of AD protection. This project will analyze at the firm level the extent of tariff-jumping FDI in U.S. AD cases and the effect of annual AD duty reviews on the incentives for foreign firms to tariff-jump. A foreign firm can achieve lower duties in future annual reviews by discontinuing its "dumping." The theory and empirical work will determine to what extent this feature of U.S. AD law discourages tariff-jumping FDI. 2) Do firms locating (or located) in the United States receive different outcomes when named in AD investigations than foreign rivals that are not invested in the United States? Quid pro quo FDI theory suggests that foreign firms may locate in the U.S. to appease protectionist sentiments and receive lowe r expected probabilities of future protection. On the other hand, a theoretical result by Blonigen and Ohno (forthcoming) suggests that firms investing in a market may aggressively export to trigger an AD investigation to generate duties on rivals that are not likely to be able to tariff-jump protection. These two hypotheses have opposite predictions for differences in duties received by foreign firms already invested in the U.S. market and those that are not. This project will estimate the extent and nature of strategic reaction by invested foreign firms to U.S. AD law. 3) To what extent does the domestic industry consider the possibility of tariff-jumping by foreign rivals when deciding whether to petition for relief through AD protection ? Casual empiricism shows that the majority of AD cases are named against firms from countries that rarely invest in the United States. When countries that often engage in FDI in the U.S. are named, the investigated product is often in an industry, such as steel, where the fixed costs of investment are relatively high. This project will theoretically and empirically investigate a domestic industry's likelihood of petitioning for costly relief given that industries and countries vary in their ability to tariff-jump AD protection. ??