Evaluating Collective Action Theory Through Cross-Cultural Analysis of Pre-Modern States

两位人类学家的这项研究将利用概率抽样和比较研究方法，更好地理解集体行动如何在前现代国家的治理中发展。 这是一个有趣的问题，因为基于集体的组织可能由于行为问题而不稳定。 理想情况下，顺从的纳税人产生盈余，这些盈余进入统治者控制的公共基金，使集体受益（公共产品），但由于统治者和臣民都希望对方在公共产品的生产和分配方面表现得当，紧张局势可能会发展。 统治者代理（为个人利益而占用公共物品）和主体搭便车（受益于公共物品，但不参与其生产）可能会威胁组织稳定性。为了确保集体组织能够发挥作用，必须发展制度来发现和控制代理和搭便车。 为了评估这一理论，并更好地理解这种制度特征是如何在复杂社会中发展起来的，这项研究将对来自世界各地的40到50个描述良好的案例的人类关系地区档案和其他来源的数据进行编码。需要编码的变量包括公益物的计量（如道路、公共供水系统、公共安全和再分配经济）、主体纳税合规、“声音”（臣民向统治者传达意见的能力），以及“退出”（不满的臣民离开政体的机会），以及统治者的行为监控和控制，统治者的道德，以及影响政策的收入和支出措施。这项研究将促进我们的理解的性质和原因的变化，在前现代国家，并将评估集体行动理论可以在不同的社会和文化环境中应用的程度。 这项研究应该是感兴趣的广泛的学生在生物和社会科学感兴趣的合作社会行为的演变，包括民主的社会和文化起源。

This research by two anthropologists will make use of probability samplingand comparative research methods to better understand how collective action can develop in the governance of pre-modern states. This is an interesting problem, because collectively-based organizations may be unstable due to behavioral problems. Ideally, compliant taxpayers produce surpluses that go to a communal fund controlled by rulers that benefits the collectivity (public goods), but tensions may develop owing to the fact that rulers and subjects will expect each other to behave appropriately with respect to the production and distribution of public goods. Ruler agency (appropriation of public goods for personal benefit) and subject free riding (benefiting from public goods but not contributing to their production) may threaten organizational stability. To assure that collective organizations can function, institutions must be developed to detect and control both agency and free riding. To evaluate the theory, and to better understand how such institutional features have been developed in complex societies, the research will code data from the Human Relations Area Files and other sources on 40 to 50 well-described cases from all world areas. Variables to be coded include measures of public goods (such as roads, public water systems, public safety, and redistributive economies), subject tax compliance, "voice" (the ability of subjects to communicate opinions to rulers), and "exit" (the opportunity for dissatisfied subjects to leave the polity), as well as ruler behavior monitoring and controls, ruler morality, and measures of income and expenditures which affect policy. This research will advance our understanding of the nature and causes of variation in pre-modern states and will evaluate the degree to which collective action theory can be applied in diverse social and cultural settings. The research should be of interest to a wide range of students in the biological and social sciences interested in the evolution of cooperative social behavior, including the social and cultural origins of democracy.