Evaluating Collective Action Theory Through Cross-Cultural Analysis of Pre-Modern States

两位人类学家的这项研究将使用概率抽样和比较研究方法来更好地理解集体行动如何在前现代国家的治理中发展。这是一个有趣的问题，因为基于集体的组织可能由于行为问题而不稳定。理想情况下，服从的纳税人会产生盈余，这些盈余会流入由统治者控制的公共基金，从而造福集体（公共产品），但由于统治者和臣民会期望对方在公共产品的生产和分配方面表现得当，这一事实可能会导致紧张局势的发展。统治者代理（为个人利益挪用公共产品）和主体搭便车（从公共产品中受益，但不为其生产做出贡献）可能威胁组织的稳定。为了确保集体组织能够发挥作用，必须建立各种机构来发现和控制代理和搭便车。为了评估这一理论，并更好地理解这些制度特征是如何在复杂的社会中发展起来的，该研究将对来自世界各地的40至50个描述良好的案例的“人际关系领域档案”和其他来源的数据进行编码。需要编码的变量包括公共产品（如道路、公共供水系统、公共安全和再分配经济）、臣民税收合规、“发言权”（臣民向统治者传达意见的能力）和“退出”（不满的臣民离开政体的机会），以及统治者行为监控、统治者道德和影响政策的收入和支出措施。这项研究将促进我们对前现代国家变化的性质和原因的理解，并将评估集体行动理论在不同社会和文化背景下的应用程度。这项研究应该引起对合作社会行为的进化感兴趣的广泛的生物和社会科学学生的兴趣，包括民主的社会和文化起源。

This research by two anthropologists will make use of probability samplingand comparative research methods to better understand how collective action can develop in the governance of pre-modern states. This is an interesting problem, because collectively-based organizations may be unstable due to behavioral problems. Ideally, compliant taxpayers produce surpluses that go to a communal fund controlled by rulers that benefits the collectivity (public goods), but tensions may develop owing to the fact that rulers and subjects will expect each other to behave appropriately with respect to the production and distribution of public goods. Ruler agency (appropriation of public goods for personal benefit) and subject free riding (benefiting from public goods but not contributing to their production) may threaten organizational stability. To assure that collective organizations can function, institutions must be developed to detect and control both agency and free riding. To evaluate the theory, and to better understand how such institutional features have been developed in complex societies, the research will code data from the Human Relations Area Files and other sources on 40 to 50 well-described cases from all world areas. Variables to be coded include measures of public goods (such as roads, public water systems, public safety, and redistributive economies), subject tax compliance, "voice" (the ability of subjects to communicate opinions to rulers), and "exit" (the opportunity for dissatisfied subjects to leave the polity), as well as ruler behavior monitoring and controls, ruler morality, and measures of income and expenditures which affect policy. This research will advance our understanding of the nature and causes of variation in pre-modern states and will evaluate the degree to which collective action theory can be applied in diverse social and cultural settings. The research should be of interest to a wide range of students in the biological and social sciences interested in the evolution of cooperative social behavior, including the social and cultural origins of democracy.