Theoretical Analysis of Bargaining in Economics and Politics

从理论上分析，民主政治可以分为选举政治（由选民决定代表）和选举后政治（由代表决定公共政策）。选举政治的研究侧重于候选人的参选决定、竞选活动的开展和选民的激励，而选举后政治的研究则从这些细节中抽象出来，关注代表之间、议会或立法机构内部或政府不同部门之间的谈判和联盟形成过程。该项目从博弈论的角度研究选举后的政治，在博弈论中，人们指定了制定公共政策的制度设置的数学模型，并在其中使用均衡概念来预测理性战略行为的结果。从技术上讲，该项目将选举后的政治分析为当选代表之间的“讨价还价游戏”。我们的目标是建立一种选举后政治理论，这种理论可以在高度结构化的情况下产生清晰的预测，比如当辩论围绕一个问题展开时，代表们的立场是明确的，这足以描述政策结果的广泛属性，比如帕累托效率或现状的稳定性，在不太透明的背景下。本课题分为四个部分：第一部分证明了在一维问题中，策略议价的唯一结果是中间（或“中值”）选民的理想结果；第二部分对问题进行了较少的结构分析，主要考虑了均衡存在、现状稳定性等问题；第三部分探讨立法机构议程形成的战略层面；第四部分考察了政策结果随时间的动态变化。由于它将理论经济学的先进方法应用于政治问题的分析，该项目的结果将有助于立法，议会和委员会决策的政治学文献，以及关于讨价还价和博弈论的经济学文献。从学术的角度来看，该项目将提高我们对选举后政治的理解，是向综合分析选举和选举后政治的一般理论迈出的一步。从长远的角度来看，这是充分理解现有政治制度、政治改革的影响以及设计更好的政治制度的必要步骤。

Democratic politics, for the purpose of theoretical analysis, might be divided into electoral politics, in which voters determine representatives, and post-electoral politics, in which representatives determine public policy. Whereas the study of electoral politics focuses on the candidate entry decision, the conduct of campaigns, and the incentives of voters, the study of post-electoral politics abstracts from these details and focuses on the process of negotiation and coalition formation among representatives, within a parliament or legislature, or across different branches of government. This project studies post-electoral politics from a game-theoretic perspective, where one specifies a mathematical model of the institutional setting in which public policy is made, and where one employs concepts of equilibrium to predict the outcomes of rational strategic behavior. In technical terms, the project analyzes post-electoral politics as a "bargaining game" among elected representatives. The objective is a theory of post-electoral politics that can yield sharp predictions in highly structured situations, as when debate revolves around one issue and positions of representatives are clear, and that is general enough to describe broad properties of policy outcomes, such as Pareto efficiency or the stability of the status quo, in less transparent contexts. The project is divided into four parts: the first part proves that, in one-dimensional problems, the unique outcome of strategic bargaining is the ideal outcome of the middle (or "median") voter; the second part assumes less structure on the problem and considers issues of equilibrium existence, the stability of the status quo, etc.; the third part considers the strategic aspects of agenda formation in legislatures; and the fourth part examines the dynamics of policy outcomes over time.Because it applies advanced methods from theoretical economics to the analysis of political issues, the results of the project will contribute both to the political science literature on legislative, parliamentary, and committee decision-making, and to the literature in economics on bargaining and game theory. From an academic standpoint, the project will improve our understanding of post-electoral politics and is a step toward a general theory that integrates the analyses of both electoral and post-electoral politics. And this, from a long-range perspective, is a necessary step in the full understanding of existing political systems, the impact of political reforms, and the design of better political institutions.