Dynamic Game-Theoretic Models of Electric Power Markets and their Vulnerability

电力市场动态博弈论模型及其脆弱性

• 批准号: 0224817
• 负责人: Benjamin Hobbs
• 金额: $ 43万
• 依托单位: Johns Hopkins University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-09-15 至 2006-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0224817&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dynamic; Game; Theoretic; Models; Electric

The issues of market power, generation adequacy, and vulnerability innetwork-constrained electric power markets are of increasing concern tomarket participants, policy makers, and the general public. Althoughprice formation and investment are inherently dynamic processes, theyare usually studied using static economic and game theoretic models.This disregarding of lags, expectations, and adjustment processes mayyield distorted conclusions about the effects of proposed changes tomarket structure and designs. To investigate and overcome thisdistortion, there is a need for (a) realistic models of dynamicinteractions among strategically behaved electric power marketparticipants, and (b) the design of efficient computationalmethods that can handle the high dimensionality of realisticpower systems.The proposed research and pedagogy have four objectives:a) formulation of dynamic game theoretic models of pricing and generationfor transmission-constrained electric power markets, for a variety ofcompetitive circumstances and market structuresb) development of efficient algorithms for solving the modelsc) demonstration and testing of models and algorithms using realistic datad) development of educational curricula integrating game theory, economics,and electric power systems.The project has several broader impacts, including contributions to education and public policy. We will develop curricular offerings in dynamic optimization and differential games for the modeling of electric power markets. This material will be made available as a professional tutorial and distributed to the educational community via the project website. Our models hold the potential of significantly enhancing the capability of regulatory agencies, market operators, and stakeholders.

受网络约束的电力市场中的市场力、发电充足性和脆弱性问题日益受到市场参与者、政策制定者和公众的关注。虽然价格形成和投资本质上是动态的过程，但它们通常是用静态的经济学和博弈论模型来研究的。这种忽视滞后、预期和调整过程的做法可能会对拟议的市场结构和设计变化的影响得出扭曲的结论。为了研究和克服这种扭曲，需要(A)战略行为的电力市场参与者之间的动态交互的现实模型，以及(B)设计能够处理现实电力系统的高维的有效计算方法。所提出的研究和教学有四个目标：a)针对不同的竞争环境和市场结构，建立输电受限电力市场的定价和发电的动态博弈论模型；c)利用现实数据对模型和算法进行演示和测试；c)开发整合博弈论、经济学和电力系统的教育课程。该项目具有几个更广泛的影响，包括对教育和公共政策的贡献。开发电力市场建模的动态优化和微分博弈课程。这些材料将作为专业教程提供，并通过项目网站分发给教育界。我们的模型具有显著增强监管机构、市场运营商和利益相关者能力的潜力。