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Collaborative Research on the Political Control of Trial Court Judges

Collaborative Research on the Political Control of Trial Court Judges
初审法院法官政治控制的协同研究
批准号:
0318033
负责人:
Gregory Huber
金额:
$10.89万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2003
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2003-07-01 至 2005-06-30

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
该提案对美国各州选择、保留和直接控制初审法院法官的不同方法的起源和影响进行了研究。该研究项目解决了两个相互关联的问题:(1)主审法官的决定是如何受到a)选择他们的方法和b)对其自由裁量权的形式限制的影响的?(2)如何解释美国各州对主审法官自由裁量权的形式限制的差异?初审法官是美国政治体系中强大的参与者,自美国建国以来,选择和以其他方式约束他们的方法一直存在争议。然而,对司法权的关注并没有产生关于不同遴选制度或对司法自由裁量权的事前限制对初审法官行为的后果进行相应的比较实证研究。此外,政治学家没有进行太多的比较工作来解释对主审法官自由裁量权采取的限制的差异。我们试图通过构建和测试一个代理理论模型来弥补这一弱点,该模型涉及初审法官的选择、保留和直接控制。这项研究将有助于为正在进行的关于遴选和留用初审法院法官的不同规则的后果的公共政策辩论提供经验证据,并将有助于这一辩论的进行。与现有的专注于选民行为、选举结果或法官描述性特征的遴选制度研究不同,研究人员对初审法官的行为进行了直接的比较审查。此外,他们试图了解对自由裁量权的事前限制,如量刑指导方针和强制性判决,如何与遴选制度相互作用,影响审判法官的行为。虽然政治学家研究了上诉法院法官在不同选举制度中的行为,但这些发现可能不会延伸到人数更多、公开程度更低的初审法官的行动,他们的行动在很大程度上管理着国家强制权力的个案应用。研究人员将继续目前正在进行的研究,汇编用于定量分析的三个数据集,并在各种机构背景下对在任审判法官进行非结构化的定性访谈。该项目提供了两个显著的下游好处。首先,调查人员构建并记录了三个数据集,详细说明了司法量刑行为、审判法官的选择经验和传记特征以及对司法自由裁量权的直接制约性质。这些数据集和附带的文件将放在公共领域。这些数据集将补充对州上诉法院的研究,并允许其他研究人员对司法选择、初审法官行为和州刑事司法政策制定进行比较研究。其次,开展这项研究将提供机会,通过让研究生参与该项目中使用的数据集的构建、记录和分析来加强他们的培训。
英文摘要
This proposal undertakes research on the origins and implications of different methods for the selection, retention, and direct control of trial court judges in the American states. The research project addresses two interrelated questions: (1) How are trial judges' decisions in office influenced by a) the method of choosing them and b) formal constraints on their discretion? (2) What explains variation in formal constraints on trial judge discretion in the American states? Trial judges are powerful actors in the American political system and the method of choosing and otherwise constraining them have been debated since the American founding. Concerns with judicial power have not, however, generated commensurate comparative empirical research on the consequences for trial judge behavior of different selection systems or ex ante constraints on judicial discretion. Moreover, political scientists have not undertaken much comparative work to explain variation in the adoption of restrictions on trial judge discretion. We seek to remedy this weakness by constructing and testing an agency-theoretic model of the selection, retention, and direct control of trial judges. This research will assist in providing empirical evidence for, and will contribute to, ongoing public policy debates about the consequences of different rules for selecting and retaining trial court judges. Unlike existing research on selection systems that focuses on voter behavior, electoral outcomes, or descriptive characteristics of judges, the researchers undertake a direct comparative examination of trial judge behavior. Further, they seek to understand how ex ante constraints on discretion like sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentences interact with selection systems to influence trial judges' behavior. While political scientists have examined the behavior of appellate court judges in different electoral systems, these findings maynot extend to the actions of the more numerous and less publicly visible trial judges whose actions in large part govern the case-by-case application of the state's coercive authority. The researchers will continue research currently underway, to compile three datasets for quantitative analysis and to conduct unstructured qualitative interviews with sitting trial judges in a variety of institutional contexts. The project offers two significant downstream benefits. First, the investigators construct and document three datasets detailing judicial sentencing behavior, the selection experience and biographical characteristics of trial judges, and the nature of direct constraints on judicial discretion. These datasets and accompanying documentation will be placed in the public domain. These datasets will complement research on state appellate courts and allow other researchers to conduct comparative research on judicialselection, trial judge behavior, and state criminal justice policymaking. Second, undertaking this research will provide opportunities to enhance the training of graduate students by involving them in the construction, documentation, and analysis of the datasets used in this project.
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Collaborative Research: Individuals' Assessments of Legitimate Authority
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  • 项目类别:
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