Topics in Dynamics, Auctions and Voting

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The project is a continuation of theoretical economic research in the areas of dynamics, auctions, and voting. Within dynamics, the questions posed bear on Markov perfect equilibrium, unforeseen contingencies, hyperbolic discounting, and the soft budget constraint. Work in auctions will investigate asymmetries between buyers, the high bid auction, efficient auctions, and auctions with seller budget constraints, while research in the area of voting will examine issues related to accountability and the robustness of voting rules.The findings on Markov perfect equilibrium should prove useful to the many applied researchers who use this equilibrium concept in their work. Research on unforeseen contingencies will be of interest to those working on the foundations of contract theory and, more generally, the foundations of decision theory. The work in hyperbolic discounting will contribute to the literature on the boundary between economics and psychology. Findings in the area of the soft budget constraint will have significance not only for academic researchers but also for those involved in designing policy for the transformation of centralized economies to decentralized systems. The questions posed under the heading of auction theory will be of interest to the large community of auction theorists, as well as to those wishing to design auctions for such purposes as privatization and pollution reduction, while the work on voting should be helpful to political economists, political scientists, and to those envisaging reform of electoral systems.