Topics in Dynamic Games (Accomplishment Based Renewal)

这是一个基于成就的更新项目，让首席研究员继续他在动态游戏和执行理论的各种主题的研究。它包括以下主题。(1)该研究扩展了之前关于进化游戏的研究，允许错误的折扣和非无穷小概率。(2)该项目描述了具有不可观察行动和不可公开观察结果的重复博弈中的均衡。(3)继续研究信贷市场模型、多期模型下的合同再谈判、信息不完全情况下再谈判的实施问题。(4)本文将马尔可夫完全均衡——一种策略只依赖于与收益相关的过去变量的均衡——扩展到不完全信息或不完全信息的情况。这些研究都涉及动态博弈论中的重要主题，有望继续帮助在经济学和其他社会科学的不同领域取得进展。

This is an accomplishment based renewal project for the principal investigator to continue his research on various topics in dynamic games and implementation theory. It includes the following topics. (1) The study extends previous research on evolutionary games to allow discounting and non-infinitesimal probabilities of mistakes. (2) The project characterizes equilibria in repeated games with unobservable actions and no publicly observable outcomes. (3) The analysis continues to investigate models of credit markets, contract renegotiation in multi-period models, and the implementation problem in cases of renegotiation with incomplete information. (4) The undertaking extends the Markov perfect equilibrium - an equilibrium in which strategies depend only on those past variables that are payoff-relevant - to the cases of incomplete information or imperfect information. These studies all deal with important topics in dynamic game theory which promise to continue to help generate progress in different areas in economics as well as in other social sciences.