Topics in Dynamic Games (Accomplishment Based Renewal)

这是一个基于成就的更新项目的主要 调查员继续对动态中的各种主题进行研究 博弈论与实现理论 它包括以下主题。 (1)这项研究将先前对进化游戏的研究扩展到了 允许贴现和非无穷小的错误概率。 (2)该项目描述了重复博弈中的均衡， 不可观察的行为和不可公开观察的结果。 (3)的 分析继续调查信贷市场的模型， 多期模型中的合同重新谈判， 在不完全重新谈判情况下执行问题 信息. (4)该事业扩展了马尔可夫完美 均衡-一个均衡，其中战略只取决于 那些与收益相关的过去变量 不完全信息或不完美信息。 这些研究 都涉及动态博弈论中的重要主题， 继续帮助在不同领域取得进展， 经济学以及其他社会科学。

This is an accomplishment based renewal project for the principal investigator to continue his research on various topics in dynamic games and implementation theory. It includes the following topics. (1) The study extends previous research on evolutionary games to allow discounting and non-infinitesimal probabilities of mistakes. (2) The project characterizes equilibria in repeated games with unobservable actions and no publicly observable outcomes. (3) The analysis continues to investigate models of credit markets, contract renegotiation in multi-period models, and the implementation problem in cases of renegotiation with incomplete information. (4) The undertaking extends the Markov perfect equilibrium - an equilibrium in which strategies depend only on those past variables that are payoff-relevant - to the cases of incomplete information or imperfect information. These studies all deal with important topics in dynamic game theory which promise to continue to help generate progress in different areas in economics as well as in other social sciences.