Topics in Dynamics and Political Economy

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This award funds work on two separate projects. The first project develops new methods in dynamic game theory. The PI works to extend the definition of Markov perfect equilibrium to the case of imperfectly observable actions. He also uses the concept of evolutionary stability to examine whether it will prove to be a powerful method for sharpening the ability of the theory of repeated games to make firm predictions.The second project addresses issues in the theory of political economy, again by using techniques and methods from game theory. The research characterizes what voting rules satisfy four key criteria (anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto property, and strategy proofness) for the widest possible set of voter preferences. This project shows what voting rules are most preferable in electoral systems. In addition, the PI builds and analyzes a model of legislative bargaining.The broader impacts of this project include developing new methods for the many different communities in social science, computer science, and biology that use game theory as a fundamental method. The work in political economy will be helpful to those envisioning reform of electoral systems.