Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition

不完全竞争的理性预期

• 批准号: 8711321
• 负责人: Eric Maskin
• 金额: $ 3.23万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-07-15 至 1989-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8711321&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Rational; Expectations; Imperfect; Competition

There is a large literature investigating the notion that in markets where knowledge is dispersed across different agents, prices serve not only to allocate resources but to transmit information. Agents expectations are assumed to be rational in the sense that they are aware of the information revealed by prices. Almost all work so far has concerned competitive markets or monopolies. A major emphasis has been on the amount of information that one can expect to be transmitted in such markets under rational expectations. The contribution of this project comes from investigating the nature of rational expectations equilibrium when some of the agents have sufficient market power to be able to affect prices but there is no monopoly. This is a very difficult problem because the amount of information transmitted becomes a matter of strategic choice. The project elucidates the nature of rational expectations equilibrium in such a framework of imperfect competition and compares the degree of information revelation with that in a competitive model.

有大量文献研究了这样一个概念，即在市场中， 当知识分散在不同的代理人之间时，价格就不起作用了。 不仅分配资源，而且传输信息。 剂 期望被假定为理性的，因为它们是 了解价格所透露的信息。 几乎所有的工作到目前为止 是竞争市场还是垄断市场。 一个主要的重点是 我们一直在关注人们可以期望传输的信息量， 在理性预期下的市场。 这个项目的贡献来自于调查的性质 理性预期均衡当一些代理人 有足够的市场力量来影响价格，但没有 垄断 这是一个非常困难的问题，因为 所传递的信息成为一个战略选择问题。 的 项目阐明了理性预期均衡的性质， 这样一个不完全竞争的框架，并比较程度， 信息披露与竞争模型。