Topics in Dynamics and Political Economy

该奖项的资金用于两个不同的项目。第一个项目开发了动态博弈论的新方法。PI致力于将马尔可夫完美均衡的定义扩展到不完全可观察的行为的情况。他还使用进化稳定性的概念来检验它是否会被证明是一种强有力的方法，以提高重复博弈理论做出坚定预测的能力。第二个项目解决政治经济学理论中的问题，再次使用博弈论中的技术和方法。这项研究的特征是，对于尽可能广泛的选民偏好集，什么投票规则满足四个关键标准(匿名性、中立性、帕累托性质和策略证明)。这个项目展示了选举制度中最可取的投票规则。此外，PI还建立并分析了一个立法讨价还价模型。该项目的更广泛影响包括为社会科学、计算机科学和生物学中的许多不同社区开发以博弈论为基本方法的新方法。政治经济学方面的工作将有助于那些设想选举制度改革的人。

This award funds work on two separate projects. The first project develops new methods in dynamic game theory. The PI works to extend the definition of Markov perfect equilibrium to the case of imperfectly observable actions. He also uses the concept of evolutionary stability to examine whether it will prove to be a powerful method for sharpening the ability of the theory of repeated games to make firm predictions.The second project addresses issues in the theory of political economy, again by using techniques and methods from game theory. The research characterizes what voting rules satisfy four key criteria (anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto property, and strategy proofness) for the widest possible set of voter preferences. This project shows what voting rules are most preferable in electoral systems. In addition, the PI builds and analyzes a model of legislative bargaining.The broader impacts of this project include developing new methods for the many different communities in social science, computer science, and biology that use game theory as a fundamental method. The work in political economy will be helpful to those envisioning reform of electoral systems.