Topics in Dynamics and Political Economy

该奖项资助两个独立的项目。第一个项目发展动态博弈论的新方法。PI的工作是将马尔可夫完美均衡的定义扩展到不完全可观察的行为。他还使用进化稳定性的概念来检验它是否将被证明是一种强有力的方法，以提高重复博弈理论做出可靠预测的能力。第二个项目解决了政治经济学理论中的问题，再次使用博弈论的技术和方法。该研究描述了哪些投票规则满足四个关键标准（匿名性、中立性、帕累托属性和策略证明性），以尽可能广泛地满足选民的偏好。这个项目展示了选举制度中最可取的投票规则。此外，PI还构建并分析了立法议价的模型。这个项目更广泛的影响包括为社会科学、计算机科学和生物学的许多不同社区开发新的方法，这些方法使用博弈论作为基本方法。政治经济学方面的工作将有助于那些设想改革选举制度的人。

This award funds work on two separate projects. The first project develops new methods in dynamic game theory. The PI works to extend the definition of Markov perfect equilibrium to the case of imperfectly observable actions. He also uses the concept of evolutionary stability to examine whether it will prove to be a powerful method for sharpening the ability of the theory of repeated games to make firm predictions.The second project addresses issues in the theory of political economy, again by using techniques and methods from game theory. The research characterizes what voting rules satisfy four key criteria (anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto property, and strategy proofness) for the widest possible set of voter preferences. This project shows what voting rules are most preferable in electoral systems. In addition, the PI builds and analyzes a model of legislative bargaining.The broader impacts of this project include developing new methods for the many different communities in social science, computer science, and biology that use game theory as a fundamental method. The work in political economy will be helpful to those envisioning reform of electoral systems.