Topics in Dynamics, Competition, Contracts, and Voting

该项目是动态模型研究的继续(研究代理人随时间的战略互动，并研究工人技能分布随时间的变化可能如何影响与这些技能相关的工资分配并受其影响)；竞争性模型(研究设计销售程序的问题--拍卖--确保出售的商品或商品最终落入最看重商品的买家手中，并研究货币政策在实现理想均衡结果方面的作用)；合同和执行(研究无法做出准确预测如何影响代理人之间最优合同的性质)；和投票(检查哪些投票规则满足所需的属性，如匿名性、中立性、传递性和在尽可能广泛的偏好域上的帕累托效率)。

The project is a continuation of research on dynamic models (studying the strategic interaction of agents over time, and also studying how changes in the distribution of workers' skills over time might influence and be influenced by the distribution of wages associated with those skills); competitive models (studying the problem of designing selling procedures - auctions - that ensure that the good or goods being sold end up in the hands of the buyers who value them the most, and also studying the role of monetary policy in achieving a desirable equilibrium outcome); contracts and implementation (studying how the inability to make accurate forecasts affects the nature of optimal contracts between agents); and voting (examining which voting rules satisfy desirable properties such as anonymity, neutrality, transitivity, and Pareto efficiency on the widest possible class of domains of preferences).