Collaborative Research: The Industrial Organization of the Political Sector: Politicians and Parties

合作研究：政治部门的产业组织：政治家和政党

• 批准号: 0617901
• 负责人: Andrea Mattozzi
• 金额: $ 15.61万
• 依托单位: California Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-09-01 至 2011-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0617901&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Industrial; Organization; Political

Proposal No: 0617901 Institution: California Institute of TechnologyNSF Program: ECONOMICS Principal Investigator: Mattozzi, Andrea Title: Collaborative Research on The Industrial Organization of the Political Sector: Politicians and Parties ABSTRACTThe very existence and functioning of representative democracy, where citizens delegate policy-making to elected representatives, hinge on the presence of a political sector, in which voters, parties, and politicians represent the counterparts of consumers, firms and managers in the market sector. The extent to which individual endowments of politicaland market skills are correlated, or experience in the political sector is also valuable in the market sector, link the labor markets in the two sectors. This link affects the selection of politicians, their careers, and the relationship between parties and voters. The proposed research will focus on two issues regarding the interactions between parties, voters and politicians in an economy with a political and a market sector. The first issue pertains to the selection of candidates for public office, the careers of politicians, and the internal organization of parties. The second issue pertains to the recruitment of politicians by political parties. The research will develop and solve dynamic equilibrium models with asymmetric information, where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market and political abilities, individual skill-endowments positively correlated, and infinitely-lived parties may nominate candidates for public office subject to the voters approval. The model will be estimated with micro data on the entry and exit of individuals in the political sector as well as their political careers in several countries the PIs will collect. The intellectual basis of this research stem from the innovative microeconomic theory of political economy that integrate political actors with private decision-makers in a general equilibrium theory way, where political institutions and outcomes are endogenous. This research contributes significantly to the literature on the industrial organization of the political sector and its interactions with the market sector. By developing and empirically implementing new dynamic models of the behavior of parties and politicians, this research will allow us to explain systematic differences in the types and durations of political careers across countries and through time, to estimate the individual returns to political experience in different political systems, and to investigate the extent to which politicians career choices and the internal organization of parties depend on institutional features of the political-economic environment. The political sector constitutes a large part of the economy, and political parties and politicians have a big influence on the remaining part of the economy. This research will contribute to our understanding of the internal organization of the political sector and will address broader issues such as: the role parties and voters in the selection of politicians, the effects of monetary incentives on the quality of politicians and their career paths, whether political systems differ with respect to the incentives for becoming politicians and the return to an individual from political experience, and whether the characteristics of politicians and their career paths differ systematically across electoral systems. Answers to these issues have implications for the efficient organization of political systems.

提案编号：0617901机构：加州理工学院NSF项目：经济学首席研究员：Mattozzi，Andrea题目：政治部门的产业组织合作研究：政治家和政党摘要代议制民主的存在和运作，即公民将决策权委托给民选代表，取决于政治部门的存在，其中选民，政党，而政治家则代表着市场部门中消费者、企业和管理者的对应方。个人的政治和市场技能的相关程度，或者政治部门的经验在市场部门也是有价值的，将这两个部门的劳动力市场联系起来。这种联系影响到政治家的选择，他们的职业生涯，以及政党和选民之间的关系。 拟议的研究将侧重于两个问题，即在一个既有政治部门又有市场部门的经济体中，政党、选民和政治家之间的互动。第一个问题涉及公职候选人的选择、政治家的职业生涯和政党的内部组织。第二个问题涉及政党招募政治人物。该研究将开发和解决具有不对称信息的动态均衡模型，其中个人在其市场和政治能力方面是异质的，个人技能禀赋正相关，并且无限寿命的政党可以提名候选人担任公职，但须经选民批准。 该模型将估计的微观数据上的个人进入和退出的政治部门，以及他们的政治生涯在几个国家的PI将收集。本研究的知识基础源于创新的微观经济理论的政治经济学，整合政治行为者与私人决策者在一般均衡理论的方式，其中政治制度和结果是内生的。这项研究对政治部门的产业组织及其与市场部门的相互作用的文献做出了重大贡献。通过开发和实证实施政党和政治家行为的新动态模型，这项研究将使我们能够解释不同国家和不同时间的政治生涯类型和持续时间的系统差异，估计不同政治制度中政治经验的个人回报，研究政治家的职业选择和政党内部组织在多大程度上取决于政治经济环境的制度特征。政治部门构成经济的很大一部分，政党和政治家对经济的其余部分有很大的影响。 这项研究将有助于我们了解政治部门的内部组织，并将解决更广泛的问题，如：政党和选民在挑选政治家方面的作用，金钱激励对政治家素质及其职业道路的影响，政治制度在激励成为政治家和个人从政治经验中获得回报方面是否不同，以及政治家的特征及其职业道路是否在选举制度中存在系统性差异。 这些问题的答案对政治系统的有效组织有影响。