Doctoral Dissertation Research on Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment: 1991 - 2006

政治环境下行政法法官决策的博士论文研究：1991年-2006年

• 批准号: 0719274
• 负责人: Robert Howard
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Georgia State University Research Foundation, Inc.
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-07-01 至 2008-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0719274&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Administrative; Law

David C. Nixon and Cole D. Taratoot Doctoral Dissertation Research: Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment, 1991 to 2006SES - 0719274 Project AbstractAn increased reliance on expert bureaucrats in an increasingly complex society combined with the insulation from politics afforded to administrators has created a dilemma in determining the proper role for unelected bureaucrats in a democratic society. Judicial scholars have demonstrated that the independence of the judicial branch enables judges to base decisions largely on their own political preferences. It is possible that the insulation from political involvement that is afforded to federal civil servants similarly enables bureaucrats to insert their own personal political preferences into policy decisionsUsing a variety of statistical methods, this study systematically examines one set of bureaucratic experts, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) at the National Labor Relations Board, to determine whether personal political preferences play a role in bureaucratic decision making. Additionally, the study examines the reach of the influence of ALJ preferences by examining the extent to which ALJ decisions are adopted by reviewing bodies when cases are appealed to the agency's Board members and the relevant U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Results help to determine the nature and pervasiveness of political decision making by bureaucrats in American government. Lastly, I examine the extent to which ALJs act strategically in their decision making when considering review by the political appointees of the Board and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and whether strategic considerations can limit or mask political decision making by ALJs. The results speak to the degree to which judicial controls provide a means of limiting bureaucratic discretion.These statistical analyses are based on a collection of nearly 6,000 initial decisions issued by over 100 ALJs as well as all subsequent appeals to the Board and Courts of Appeals, since 1991. The project identifies ALJ political party affiliation by contacting state and local boards of elections and searching FEC records. Party affiliation data are gathered primarily at locations surrounding the four Divisions of Judges of the NLRB: Atlanta, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. This project makes exciting new contributions to literature in both bureaucratic and judicial politics. It extends our understanding of the judicial process into the realm of the bureaucracy, an arena we know to be highly legalistic. It also augments our understanding of bureaucratic incentives, by specifically examining political preferences. If the public's desire to have complex decisions made on the basis of expertise is instead met with bureaucrats who rely on their own political preferences to solve problems, this prompts us to reassess our increasing reliance on unelected government officials to make decisions that impact Americans.

David C. Nixon 和 Cole D. Taratoot 博士论文研究：政治环境中的行政法法官决策，1991 年至 2006SES - 0719274 项目摘要 在日益复杂的社会中，对专家官僚的依赖日益增加，加上行政人员与政治的隔绝，在确定民主社会中未经选举产生的官僚的适当角色时造成了困境。 司法学者已经证明，司法部门的独立性使法官能够在很大程度上根据自己的政治偏好做出决定。联邦公务员与政治参与的隔离可能同样使官僚能够将自己的个人政治偏好纳入政策决策。本研究使用各种统计方法，系统地考察了一组官僚专家，即国家劳动关系委员会的行政法法官（ALJ），以确定个人政治偏好是否在官僚决策中发挥作用。 此外，该研究还通过考察当案件向该机构的董事会成员和相关美国巡回上诉法院提出上诉时，审查机构采纳 ALJ 决定的程度，从而考察 ALJ 偏好的影响范围。 结果有助于确定美国政府官僚政治决策的性质和普遍性。 最后，我研究了行政法官在考虑董事会和美国巡回上诉法院政治任命人员的审查时在决策中采取战略性行动的程度，以及战略考虑是否会限制或掩盖行政法官的政治决策。 结果表明司法控制在多大程度上限制了官僚自由裁量权。这些统计分析基于自 1991 年以来 100 多名 ALJ 发布的近 6,000 项初步决定以及随后向委员会和上诉法院提出的所有上诉。该项目通过联系州和地方选举委员会并搜索 FEC 记录来识别 ALJ 的政党关系。 党派关系数据主要在 NLRB 四个法官部门周围的地点收集：亚特兰大、纽约、旧金山和华盛顿特区。该项目为官僚政治和司法政治领域的文献做出了令人兴奋的新贡献。 它将我们对司法程序的理解延伸到官僚机构的领域，我们知道这是一个高度法律主义的领域。通过专门考察政治偏好，它还增强了我们对官僚激励的理解。如果公众希望根据专业知识做出复杂决策的愿望，却被依靠自己的政治偏好来解决问题的官僚所满足，这将促使我们重新评估我们日益依赖未经选举产生的政府官员来做出影响美国人的决策。