Doctoral Dissertation Research on Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment: 1991 - 2006

大卫C.尼克松和科尔D. Taratoot博士论文研究：政治环境中的行政法法官决策，1991年至2006年SES- 0719274项目摘要在日益复杂的社会中，对专家官僚的依赖日益增加，再加上行政人员与政治的绝缘，在确定民主社会中未经选举产生的官僚的适当角色方面造成了困境。 司法学者已经证明，司法分支的独立性使法官能够在很大程度上根据自己的政治倾向作出决定。这是可能的，绝缘从政治参与，是提供给联邦公务员同样使官僚插入自己的个人政治偏好到政策决定，使用各种统计方法，本研究系统地考察了一组官僚专家，行政法法官（ALJs）在国家劳动关系委员会，以确定个人政治偏好是否在官僚决策中发挥作用。 此外，该研究还通过审查当案件上诉到该机构的董事会成员和相关的美国巡回上诉法院时，审查机构在多大程度上通过了行政法法官的决定，来审查行政法法官偏好的影响范围。 研究结果有助于确定美国政府官僚政治决策的性质和普遍性。 最后，我研究在何种程度上ALJs的行为战略决策时，考虑审查的政治任命的董事会和美国巡回上诉法院，以及战略考虑是否可以限制或掩盖政治决策ALJs。 这些统计分析的基础是1991年以来100多名行政法法官发布的近6，000项初步裁决以及随后向委员会和上诉法院提出的所有上诉。 该项目通过联系州和地方选举委员会和搜索FEC记录来确定ALJ的政党关系。 党派数据主要收集在NLRB的四个法官分部周围的地点：亚特兰大，纽约，旧金山弗朗西斯科和华盛顿，华盛顿特区。该项目为官僚和司法政治的文学做出了令人兴奋的新贡献。 它将我们对司法程序的理解扩展到官僚领域，我们知道这是一个高度法律化的竞技场。通过专门研究政治偏好，它还增强了我们对官僚激励的理解。如果公众希望在专业知识的基础上做出复杂的决定，而官僚们却依靠自己的政治偏好来解决问题，这将促使我们重新评估我们对非民选政府官员做出影响美国人的决定的日益依赖。

David C. Nixon and Cole D. Taratoot Doctoral Dissertation Research: Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment, 1991 to 2006SES - 0719274 Project AbstractAn increased reliance on expert bureaucrats in an increasingly complex society combined with the insulation from politics afforded to administrators has created a dilemma in determining the proper role for unelected bureaucrats in a democratic society. Judicial scholars have demonstrated that the independence of the judicial branch enables judges to base decisions largely on their own political preferences. It is possible that the insulation from political involvement that is afforded to federal civil servants similarly enables bureaucrats to insert their own personal political preferences into policy decisionsUsing a variety of statistical methods, this study systematically examines one set of bureaucratic experts, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) at the National Labor Relations Board, to determine whether personal political preferences play a role in bureaucratic decision making. Additionally, the study examines the reach of the influence of ALJ preferences by examining the extent to which ALJ decisions are adopted by reviewing bodies when cases are appealed to the agency's Board members and the relevant U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Results help to determine the nature and pervasiveness of political decision making by bureaucrats in American government. Lastly, I examine the extent to which ALJs act strategically in their decision making when considering review by the political appointees of the Board and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and whether strategic considerations can limit or mask political decision making by ALJs. The results speak to the degree to which judicial controls provide a means of limiting bureaucratic discretion.These statistical analyses are based on a collection of nearly 6,000 initial decisions issued by over 100 ALJs as well as all subsequent appeals to the Board and Courts of Appeals, since 1991. The project identifies ALJ political party affiliation by contacting state and local boards of elections and searching FEC records. Party affiliation data are gathered primarily at locations surrounding the four Divisions of Judges of the NLRB: Atlanta, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. This project makes exciting new contributions to literature in both bureaucratic and judicial politics. It extends our understanding of the judicial process into the realm of the bureaucracy, an arena we know to be highly legalistic. It also augments our understanding of bureaucratic incentives, by specifically examining political preferences. If the public's desire to have complex decisions made on the basis of expertise is instead met with bureaucrats who rely on their own political preferences to solve problems, this prompts us to reassess our increasing reliance on unelected government officials to make decisions that impact Americans.