Collaborative Research - The Quality of Elected Public Officials: Causes and Consequences.
合作研究 - 当选公职人员的质量:原因和后果。
基本信息
- 批准号:9986255
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 2万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Standard Grant
- 财政年份:2000
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:2000-05-15 至 2002-04-30
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
This planning grant will enable two young investigators to complete theoretical studies on the causes and consequences of the quality of the political leadership in representative democracies and develop a program of empirical research to test the theory. The focus is on two dimensions of quality: competence and honesty. A model is developed that captures a rigorous theory of the determinants of the average quality (in terms of competence, honesty, or both) of office holders. The model spotlights incentives to run for office as the key determinant of the quality of the political elite. The most interesting results emerge when such incentives are endogenous. Specifically, if the returns from holding office are increasing in the average quality of office holders, there can be multiple equilibria in office-holders' quality. There are "high" equilibria in which, many office holders being of high quality, it pays for high--quality citizens to run, and "low" equilibria in which, many office holders being of low-quality, high-quality citizens are discouraged from running. The investigators also look more closely at the role that institutions - and especially electoral systems and party organizations - play in determining the average quality of office holders. In the model, the citizen-candidates differ from one another not only in terms of quality but also in terms of ideological position (on a uni-dimensional policy space) and intensity of policy preferences vs. quality preferences. There is a party for each ideological position and the party leaders choose the candidates in each district. The model allows the investigators to consider a variety of electoral systems and includes a description of the ex post coalition formation game taking place in the Parliament if no party achieves the absolute majority. A preliminary result in this rich framework is that if most voters have a high intensity of policy preferences (caring less about quality), then plurality rule always creates incentives for party leaders to select high--quality candidates, whereas under proportional representation there exist equilibria with low average quality of office holders.The project also begins a large-scale data collection effort aimed at documenting variation across countries in the average quality of the political leadership. While cross-country data on corruption already exist, comparable data on office holders' skills have not been heretofore available: this project aims to fill this gap. The project will start collecting information by country on elected officials' education, previous profession, previous income and social status. These proxies for office holders' ability can be used to test and/or inform theories of the determinants of office holders' quality, as well as to investigate its consequences.
这笔规划拨款将使两名年轻的研究人员能够完成对代议制民主国家政治领导质量的原因和后果的理论研究,并制定一个实证研究计划来检验这一理论。重点关注质量的两个维度:能力和诚实。开发了一个模型,该模型捕捉了公职人员平均素质(能力、诚实或两者兼而有之)的决定因素的严格理论。这种模式突出了竞选公职的动机,认为这是政治精英素质的关键决定因素。当这种激励是内生的时,最有趣的结果就会出现。具体地说,如果担任公职的回报提高了公职人员的平均素质,那么任职人员的素质可能会出现多重均衡。在“高”均衡中,许多官员是高素质的,高素质的公民参选是有回报的;而在“低”均衡中,许多低素质、高素质的公民被阻止参选。调查人员还更密切地考察了机构--尤其是选举制度和政党组织--在决定公职人员平均素质方面所发挥的作用。在该模型中,公民候选人不仅在质量上存在差异,而且在意识形态立场(在单维政策空间上)以及政策偏好与质量偏好的强度方面也存在差异。每个意识形态阵地都有一个党,党的领导人在每个区选择候选人。该模型允许调查人员考虑各种选举制度,并包括对在没有政党获得绝对多数的情况下在议会中发生的后联盟形成游戏的描述。在这个丰富的框架中,一个初步的结果是,如果大多数选民有高度的政策偏好(不太关心质量),那么多数原则总是会激励政党领导人选择高质量的候选人,而在比例代表制下,存在着官员平均素质较低的均衡。该项目还开始了一项大规模的数据收集工作,旨在记录各国政治领导层平均素质的差异。虽然关于腐败的跨国数据已经存在,但迄今为止还没有关于公职人员技能的可比数据:该项目旨在填补这一空白。该项目将开始按国家收集有关民选官员的教育程度、以前的职业、以前的收入和社会地位的信息。这些衡量官员能力的指标可以用来测试和/或告知官员素质决定因素的理论,以及调查其后果。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(0)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
数据更新时间:{{ journalArticles.updateTime }}
{{
item.title }}
{{ item.translation_title }}
- DOI:
{{ item.doi }} - 发表时间:
{{ item.publish_year }} - 期刊:
- 影响因子:{{ item.factor }}
- 作者:
{{ item.authors }} - 通讯作者:
{{ item.author }}
数据更新时间:{{ journalArticles.updateTime }}
{{ item.title }}
- 作者:
{{ item.author }}
数据更新时间:{{ monograph.updateTime }}
{{ item.title }}
- 作者:
{{ item.author }}
数据更新时间:{{ sciAawards.updateTime }}
{{ item.title }}
- 作者:
{{ item.author }}
数据更新时间:{{ conferencePapers.updateTime }}
{{ item.title }}
- 作者:
{{ item.author }}
数据更新时间:{{ patent.updateTime }}
Massimo Morelli其他文献
Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
- DOI:
10.1007/s00199-011-0611-0 - 发表时间:
2011-03-18 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:1.100
- 作者:
Guillaume R. Fréchette;John H. Kagel;Massimo Morelli - 通讯作者:
Massimo Morelli
A Dynamic Theory of Secession
分裂的动态理论
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2015 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Joan Esteban;Sabine Flamand;Massimo Morelli;Dominic Rohner - 通讯作者:
Dominic Rohner
Resource concentration and civil wars
- DOI:
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.06.003 - 发表时间:
2015-11-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:
- 作者:
Massimo Morelli;Dominic Rohner - 通讯作者:
Dominic Rohner
The Survival and Demise of the State: A Dynamic Theory of Secession
国家的生存与消亡:分裂的动态理论
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2018 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Joan Esteban;Massimo Morelli;Dominic Rohner - 通讯作者:
Dominic Rohner
Retrading in market games
市场游戏中的再交易
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2004 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
S. Ghosal;Massimo Morelli - 通讯作者:
Massimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli的其他文献
{{
item.title }}
{{ item.translation_title }}
- DOI:
{{ item.doi }} - 发表时间:
{{ item.publish_year }} - 期刊:
- 影响因子:{{ item.factor }}
- 作者:
{{ item.authors }} - 通讯作者:
{{ item.author }}
{{ truncateString('Massimo Morelli', 18)}}的其他基金
Collaborative Research: Theory, Experiments, and Empirical Methodology of Coalition Bargaining: An Integrated Approach
协作研究:联盟谈判的理论、实验和实证方法:一种综合方法
- 批准号:
0811966 - 财政年份:2007
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: Theory, Experiments, and Empirical Methodology of Coalition Bargaining: An Integrated Approach
协作研究:联盟谈判的理论、实验和实证方法:一种综合方法
- 批准号:
0519205 - 财政年份:2005
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Continuing grant
Economic and Political Implications of Different Electoral Rules
不同选举规则的经济和政治影响
- 批准号:
0213312 - 财政年份:2002
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Continuing grant
相似国自然基金
Research on Quantum Field Theory without a Lagrangian Description
- 批准号:24ZR1403900
- 批准年份:2024
- 资助金额:0.0 万元
- 项目类别:省市级项目
Cell Research
- 批准号:31224802
- 批准年份:2012
- 资助金额:24.0 万元
- 项目类别:专项基金项目
Cell Research
- 批准号:31024804
- 批准年份:2010
- 资助金额:24.0 万元
- 项目类别:专项基金项目
Cell Research (细胞研究)
- 批准号:30824808
- 批准年份:2008
- 资助金额:24.0 万元
- 项目类别:专项基金项目
Research on the Rapid Growth Mechanism of KDP Crystal
- 批准号:10774081
- 批准年份:2007
- 资助金额:45.0 万元
- 项目类别:面上项目
相似海外基金
Collaborative Research: Fusion of Siloed Data for Multistage Manufacturing Systems: Integrative Product Quality and Machine Health Management
协作研究:多级制造系统的孤立数据融合:集成产品质量和机器健康管理
- 批准号:
2323083 - 财政年份:2024
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Fusion of Siloed Data for Multistage Manufacturing Systems: Integrative Product Quality and Machine Health Management
协作研究:多级制造系统的孤立数据融合:集成产品质量和机器健康管理
- 批准号:
2323084 - 财政年份:2024
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Fusion of Siloed Data for Multistage Manufacturing Systems: Integrative Product Quality and Machine Health Management
协作研究:多级制造系统的孤立数据融合:集成产品质量和机器健康管理
- 批准号:
2323082 - 财政年份:2024
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Frameworks: Automated Quality Assurance and Quality Control for the StraboSpot Geologic Information System and Observational Data
合作研究:框架:StraboSpot 地质信息系统和观测数据的自动化质量保证和质量控制
- 批准号:
2311822 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: URoL:ASC: Applying rules of life to forecast emergent behavior of phytoplankton and advance water quality management
合作研究:URoL:ASC:应用生命规则预测浮游植物的紧急行为并推进水质管理
- 批准号:
2318862 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: FMitF: Track I: DeepSmith: Scheduling with Quality Guarantees for Efficient DNN Model Execution
合作研究:FMitF:第一轨:DeepSmith:为高效 DNN 模型执行提供质量保证的调度
- 批准号:
2349461 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Machine Learning-assisted Ultrafast Physical Vapor Deposition of High Quality, Large-area Functional Thin Films
合作研究:机器学习辅助超快物理气相沉积高质量、大面积功能薄膜
- 批准号:
2226918 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: REU Site: Water resources and quality in the Riviera Maya, Mexico
合作研究:REU 站点:墨西哥里维埃拉玛雅的水资源和质量
- 批准号:
2244454 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Machine Learning-assisted Ultrafast Physical Vapor Deposition of High Quality, Large-area Functional Thin Films
合作研究:机器学习辅助超快物理气相沉积高质量、大面积功能薄膜
- 批准号:
2226908 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: SHF: Medium: Improving Software Quality by Automatically Reproducing Failures from Bug Reports
协作研究:SHF:中:通过自动重现错误报告中的故障来提高软件质量
- 批准号:
2403747 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 2万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant