Economic and Political Implications of Different Electoral Rules

选举规则的设计或改革一直是世界上许多国家激烈辩论的主题。此外，选举制度的选择可能会产生重要的经济后果，因为选举产生的决策机构存在差异。在这个项目中，我从以下几个方面比较了比例代表制和多数制：(1)有效政党的数量；(2)预期的政策、政策差异和福利；(3)腐败；(4)战略性投票与真诚投票；(5)平权行动和性别平等。这些目标既有理论上的追求，也有经验上的追求：代议制民主模式必须允许战略政党行为、战略投票、候选人和新政党的自由进入以及在任优势，必须允许政客同时拥有政策偏好和私人目标。考虑到所有这些因素，该模型表明，多数制导致更多的政策差异，更少的腐败，更少的性别平等：这些和许多其他预测将在国际数据和一些详细的国家研究的基础上进行检验。该项目的理论和经验结论对于新民主国家的选举设计以及现有民主国家的选举改革可能是重要的。除选举公式的后果外，该项目与政策有关的结论将涉及封闭名单制度与开放名单制度的比较、性别配额的有效性和可取性、比例制度的最佳法律门槛以及公共和私人竞选筹资的最佳组合。此外，该理论框架可能会对未来对民主决策的其他方面感兴趣的研究人员非常有用。

The design or reform of electoral rules has been a subject of intense debate in many countries all over the world. Moreover, the choice of an electoral system may have important economic consequences, because of the induced difference in terms of the elected policy-making body. In this project I compare proportional representation systems and majoritarian systems in terms of: (1) the number of effective parties; (2) the expected policies, policy variance and welfare; (3) corruption; (4) strategic versus sincere voting; (5) affirmative action and gender equality. These objectives are pursued theoretically as well as empirically: the representative democracy model has to allow for strategic party behavior, strategic voting, free entry of candidates and new parties, and incumbency advantages, and politicians must be allowed to have both policy preferences and private objectives. With all these ingredients the model suggests that majoritarian systems induce more policy variance, less corruption, and less gender equality: these and many other predictions will be tested on international data and on the basis of some detailed country studies.The theoretical and empirical conclusions of the project can be important for electoral design in new democracies as well as for electoral reforms in established democracies. Beside the consequences of electoral formulas, the policy relevant conclusions of the project will involve the comparison of closed versus open list systems, the effectiveness and desirability of gender quotas, the optimal legal thresholds in proportional systems, and the optimal mix of public and private campaign financing. Moreover, the theoretical framework will probably be very useful for future researchers interested in other aspects of democratic policymaking.