Economic and Political Implications of Different Electoral Rules

选举规则的设计或改革一直是全世界许多国家激烈辩论的主题。此外，选举制度的选择可能会产生重要的经济后果，因为在当选的决策机构方面会引起差异。在这个项目中，我比较了比例代表制和多数主义制度：（1）有效政党的数量;（2）预期的政策，政策差异和福利;（3）腐败;（4）战略与真诚的投票;（5）平权行动和性别平等。这些目标在理论上和经验上都是追求的：代议制民主模式必须允许战略性的政党行为、战略性的投票、候选人和新政党的自由进入以及在职优势，必须允许政治家既有政策偏好又有私人目标。所有这些成分的模型表明，多数主义制度会导致更多的政策差异，减少腐败，减少性别平等：这些和许多其他预测将在国际数据和一些详细的国家study.The项目的理论和实证结论的基础上进行测试在新的民主国家的选举设计，以及在已建立的民主国家的选举改革可能是重要的。除了选举公式的后果外，该项目的政策相关结论将涉及封闭名单制度与开放名单制度的比较、性别配额的有效性和可取性、比例制度中的最佳法律的门槛以及公共和私人竞选筹资的最佳组合。此外，该理论框架可能对未来对民主决策其他方面感兴趣的研究者非常有用。

The design or reform of electoral rules has been a subject of intense debate in many countries all over the world. Moreover, the choice of an electoral system may have important economic consequences, because of the induced difference in terms of the elected policy-making body. In this project I compare proportional representation systems and majoritarian systems in terms of: (1) the number of effective parties; (2) the expected policies, policy variance and welfare; (3) corruption; (4) strategic versus sincere voting; (5) affirmative action and gender equality. These objectives are pursued theoretically as well as empirically: the representative democracy model has to allow for strategic party behavior, strategic voting, free entry of candidates and new parties, and incumbency advantages, and politicians must be allowed to have both policy preferences and private objectives. With all these ingredients the model suggests that majoritarian systems induce more policy variance, less corruption, and less gender equality: these and many other predictions will be tested on international data and on the basis of some detailed country studies.The theoretical and empirical conclusions of the project can be important for electoral design in new democracies as well as for electoral reforms in established democracies. Beside the consequences of electoral formulas, the policy relevant conclusions of the project will involve the comparison of closed versus open list systems, the effectiveness and desirability of gender quotas, the optimal legal thresholds in proportional systems, and the optimal mix of public and private campaign financing. Moreover, the theoretical framework will probably be very useful for future researchers interested in other aspects of democratic policymaking.