Economic and Political Implications of Different Electoral Rules

不同选举规则的经济和政治影响

• 批准号: 0213312
• 负责人: Massimo Morelli
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Ohio State University Research Foundation -DO NOT USE
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-08-15 至 2006-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0213312&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Economic; Political; Implications; Different; Electoral

The design or reform of electoral rules has been a subject of intense debate in many countries all over the world. Moreover, the choice of an electoral system may have important economic consequences, because of the induced difference in terms of the elected policy-making body. In this project I compare proportional representation systems and majoritarian systems in terms of: (1) the number of effective parties; (2) the expected policies, policy variance and welfare; (3) corruption; (4) strategic versus sincere voting; (5) affirmative action and gender equality. These objectives are pursued theoretically as well as empirically: the representative democracy model has to allow for strategic party behavior, strategic voting, free entry of candidates and new parties, and incumbency advantages, and politicians must be allowed to have both policy preferences and private objectives. With all these ingredients the model suggests that majoritarian systems induce more policy variance, less corruption, and less gender equality: these and many other predictions will be tested on international data and on the basis of some detailed country studies.The theoretical and empirical conclusions of the project can be important for electoral design in new democracies as well as for electoral reforms in established democracies. Beside the consequences of electoral formulas, the policy relevant conclusions of the project will involve the comparison of closed versus open list systems, the effectiveness and desirability of gender quotas, the optimal legal thresholds in proportional systems, and the optimal mix of public and private campaign financing. Moreover, the theoretical framework will probably be very useful for future researchers interested in other aspects of democratic policymaking.

在世界上许多国家，选举规则的设计或改革一直是一个激烈辩论的主题。此外，选择一种选举制度可能会产生重要的经济后果，因为选举产生的决策机构会产生不同。在这个项目中，我从以下方面比较了比例代表制和多数主义制度：(1)有效政党的数量；(2)预期政策、政策差异与福利；(3)腐败;(4)战略投票与真诚投票；(5)平权行动与性别平等。这些目标在理论上和经验上都得到了追求：代议制民主模式必须允许战略性政党行为、战略性投票、候选人和新政党的自由进入，以及在职优势，政治家必须被允许同时拥有政策偏好和私人目标。考虑到所有这些因素，该模型表明多数主义制度会导致更多的政策差异、更少的腐败和更少的性别平等：这些和许多其他预测将在国际数据和一些详细的国家研究的基础上得到检验。该项目的理论和经验结论对新民主国家的选举设计以及老牌民主国家的选举改革都很重要。除了选举公式的后果外，该项目的与政策有关的结论将涉及封闭名单制度与开放名单制度的比较、性别配额的有效性和可取性、比例制度的最佳法律门槛以及公共和私人竞选资金的最佳组合。此外，该理论框架可能对未来对民主决策的其他方面感兴趣的研究人员非常有用。