Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Investigating Majority Rule Voting in Common Pool Resource Settings

政治学博士论文研究：研究公共池资源设置中的多数规则投票

• 批准号: 0819024
• 负责人: Elinor Ostrom
• 金额: $ 1.2万
• 依托单位: Indiana University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-08-01 至 2010-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0819024&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

Large scale resource systems, such as ocean fisheries and national forests, are managed by a variety of governance systems. Over the past few decades, these resource systems have been the subject of numerous case studies and large-sample analyses investigating the efficiency of alternative forms of governance at encouraging long run sustainable harvesting. In particular, studies have focused on how government bureaucracies, specialized courts, religious figures, or privatization of the commons can improve long run resource management. As the advanced democracies increasingly utilize voting institutions like commissions, committees, legislatures, or user-based associations to govern natural resource settings, however, it has become increasingly important to understand the capabilities and limitations of voting systems to produce policies yielding stable, long run resource yields. How do different voting rules affect the final distribution of resource harvesting rights? Under what structural conditions can voting lead to long run sustainability of resources? And, under what conditions will voting create incentives to over-harvest? The project investigates these questions by creating controlled laboratory experiments of how individuals divide a shared resource using majority rule voting. To date, surprisingly little research has examined the effect of voting institutions in producing sustainable, long run extraction policies. One might expect that a voting system will produce equitable outcomes since a diverse set of actors or stakeholders are a part of the decision making process. It might also be the case, however, that some actors are capable of pushing through a proposal that either benefits one group at the expense of others or that short run political interest will trump long term sustainability considerations. The project investigates how voting operates to aggregate or potentially mediate individual resource users' preferences for un-sustainable levels of extraction into successful resource management systems. By utilizing laboratory experiments that carefully control the characteristics of a shared resource among harvesters, this study tests the capabilities and limitations of existing theory to explain policy outcomes. The findings will contribute to the real-world policy debates over how best to manage fragile resource stocks.

大规模的资源系统，如海洋渔业和国家森林，由各种治理系统管理。 在过去的几十年里，这些资源系统一直是许多案例研究和大样本分析的主题，调查替代治理形式在鼓励长期可持续采伐方面的效率。特别是，研究集中在政府官僚机构，专门法院，宗教人物，或公有地私有化如何改善长期资源管理。 然而，随着先进民主国家越来越多地利用委员会，委员会，立法机构或基于用户的协会等投票机构来管理自然资源环境，了解投票系统的能力和局限性以产生稳定的政策变得越来越重要，长期资源收益率。 不同的投票规则如何影响资源开采权的最终分配？ 在什么样的结构条件下，投票可以导致资源的长期可持续性？ 而且，在什么条件下投票会刺激过度捕捞？ 该项目通过创建受控实验室实验来研究这些问题，这些实验是关于个人如何使用多数规则投票来分配共享资源的。迄今为止，令人惊讶的是，很少有研究审查投票机构在制定可持续的长期开采政策方面的影响。 人们可能会期望投票制度将产生公平的结果，因为各种各样的行为者或利益攸关方是决策过程的一部分。 然而，也可能是这样的情况，即一些行为者能够推动一项提案，使一个群体受益而牺牲其他群体，或者短期政治利益将压倒长期可持续性考虑。 该项目调查投票如何运作，以聚合或潜在的调解个别资源用户的偏好，不可持续的水平提取到成功的资源管理系统。通过利用实验室实验，仔细控制收割机之间的共享资源的特性，本研究测试现有理论的能力和局限性，以解释政策的结果。 研究结果将有助于关于如何最好地管理脆弱资源库存的现实世界政策辩论。