MOD: A Political-Economic Model of Opposition/Support for Science and Innovation Policies

MOD：科学和创新政策反对/支持的政治经济模型

• 批准号: 0829546
• 负责人: Mark Taylor
• 金额: $ 5.76万
• 依托单位: Georgia Tech Research Corporation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-12-15 至 2010-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0829546&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: MOD; Political; Economic; Model; Opposition

This project addresses an important gap in the science of science and innovation policy scholarship by explaining why well-designed science and innovation policies are sometimes blocked, distorted, or improperly executed. It develops a model of how domestic political variables affect the design, passage, and implementation of science and innovation policy (SIP). The key distinction in this project is that most innovation research takes support for science and technology as given, and then asks which policies can best achieve the nation?s science and technology goals. In contrast, this research project problematizes support for science and technology. That is, it acknowledges that technological change creates political and economic winners and losers within society. It then attempts to model the behavior of these winning and losing interest-groups in regards to SIP. History shows that the losers will fight to obstruct, co-opt, or alter otherwise "good" policies that promote science and innovation. Thus, understanding how and why these fights evolve is essential for understanding why some countries are better at science and technological change than others. Put differently, what this research contributes, that previous work has not, is a better understanding of how and why political resistance to technological change arises, and the conditions under which it can affect SIP and SIP outcomes.Political-economic models, such as the one developed in this project, have been successfully used to explain policy development in other important subfields such as free trade, international finance, and economic development. This project probes the feasibility of applying these modeling approaches to better explain SIP outcomes. Certainly case studies of individual instances of successful or failed innovation policy have been performed, but a more general political-economic model (such as the one designed in this project) has yet to be presented. This research project therefore opens up a new avenue of SciSIP research, one with substantial complementarities with existing lines of SciSIP scholarship. Specifically, it investigates the effects on SIP of: political battles between different interest-groups, different political institutions (legislatures, executives, bureaucracies), and their different policy priorities under changing national economic and security conditions.Broader impacts: This research helps to explain why otherwise "good" policies and institutions fail to deliver scientific and technological progress. It therefore informs the innovation debates taking place within a variety of disciplines (economics, political science, business, industry studies), each of which tends to omit analysis of the politics behind innovation policies and institutions (or at least lacks a general model of these politics). A successful model also informs the policy process. It identifies the conditions under which certain policy designs might be more or less likely to be passed and properly implemented by government. This can aid strategies for achieving more widespread political support for SIPs and their implementation, and thereby help policymakers deliver more effective SIPs. The products of this research are being disseminated online, at academic and policy research conferences, in graduate and undergraduate level courses, and in peer-reviewed journal articles. The project is also being used as an opportunity contribute to research training by involving a graduate student research assistant. Therefore this project impacts research, policymaking, and student communities.

该项目通过解释为什么精心设计的科学和创新政策有时会被阻止，扭曲或不当执行，解决了科学和创新政策奖学金的科学中的一个重要差距。它开发了一个模型，国内政治变量如何影响科学和创新政策（SIP）的设计，通过和实施。该项目的关键区别在于，大多数创新研究都将科学和技术的支持视为既定的，然后询问哪些政策最能实现国家的目标？的科技目标。相反，本研究项目使科学和技术支持问题化。也就是说，它承认技术变革在社会中创造了政治和经济赢家和输家。然后，它试图模拟这些获胜和失败的利益集团在SIP方面的行为。历史表明，失败者将竭力阻挠、拉拢或改变促进科学和创新的“好”政策。因此，了解这些斗争如何以及为什么演变，对于理解为什么有些国家比其他国家更擅长科学和技术变革至关重要。换句话说，这项研究的贡献，以前的工作没有，是更好地理解如何和为什么政治阻力的技术变革出现，以及在何种条件下，它可以影响SIP和SIP的结果。政治经济模型，如在这个项目中开发的一个，已成功地用于解释政策发展的其他重要子领域，如自由贸易，国际金融，和经济发展本项目探讨了应用这些建模方法来更好地解释SIP结果的可行性。当然，已经对创新政策成功或失败的个案进行了案例研究，但还没有提出一个更普遍的政治经济模型（如本项目中设计的模型）。因此，该研究项目开辟了一条新的SciSIP研究途径，与现有的SciSIP奖学金有很大的互补性。具体而言，它调查SIP的影响：不同利益集团之间的政治斗争，不同的政治机构（立法机关，行政机关，官僚机构），以及他们不同的政策优先事项在不断变化的国家经济和安全conditions.Broader的影响：这项研究有助于解释为什么否则“好”的政策和机构未能提供科学和技术进步。因此，它为各种学科（经济学、政治学、商业、工业研究）中发生的创新辩论提供了信息，每一种学科都倾向于忽略对创新政策和制度背后的政治的分析（或者至少缺乏这些政治的一般模型）。一个成功的模式也为政策进程提供了信息。它确定了某些政策设计或多或少可能被政府通过和适当实施的条件。这可以帮助战略实现对部门投资方案及其实施的更广泛的政治支持，从而帮助决策者提供更有效的部门投资方案。这项研究的成果正在网上、学术和政策研究会议、研究生和本科生课程以及同行评审的期刊文章中传播。该项目还被用作一个机会，通过让一名研究生研究助理参与，促进研究培训。因此，该项目影响研究，决策和学生社区。