NECO: Provably Assurable Ad Hoc Networks under Arbitrary Malicious Behaviors

自组织无线网络在许多应用领域变得越来越重要。在这些网络中，节点之间相互合作以完成集体任务，而不需要任何预先存在的基础设施。然而，网络的合作性质和可能部署的敌对环境使它们容易受到各种安全攻击。其中一些攻击可以通过定制的加密原语来解决。然而，攻击者可以物理地破坏网络节点，从而破坏加密措施。此外，攻击者可能比合法节点具有更高的计算和通信能力，并且恶意节点之间可以相互勾结。这在保护自组织网络方面造成了一种困难的不平衡——防御困难且消耗资源，而攻击通常很容易。在这个项目中，普渡大学的pi正在开发一个可证明可靠的自组织网络协议套件来扭转这种不平衡。所开发的系统可以在广泛且严格可量化的对抗行为范围（包括拜占庭行为）下提供有保证的安全属性。该项目有两个重点：(i)多样化和随机化的安全；（二）通过问责制和声誉实现安全。该解决方案适用于安全路由、安全数据聚合和分布式领导者选择。更广泛的影响：该项目将显著提高我们对无线自组织网络安全基本限制的理解。它将为大量关键任务应用提供可证明安全的无线协议设计方法。结果将通过公开发布详细的设计文件、软件和研究生课程材料来传播。

Ad hoc wireless networks are becoming important in several application domains. In these networks, nodes cooperate among themselves to achieve collective tasks, without requiring any pre-existing infrastructure. However, the cooperative nature and the possible hostile environments where the networks may be deployed make them vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks. Some of these attacks can be addressed through customized cryptographic primitives. However, the adversary can physically compromise the network nodes, and thus defeat the cryptographic measures. Further, the adversary may have much higher computational and communication capabilities than the legitimate nodes, and the malicious nodes can collude among themselves. This has created a difficult imbalance in securing ad hoc networks---defense is hard and resource-consuming while attack is often easy.In this project, the PIs at Purdue University are developing a provably-assurable ad hoc network protocol suite to invert this imbalance. The system developed can give guaranteed security properties under a wide, and rigorously quantifiable, range of adversarial behaviors, including Byzantine behaviors. The project employs two main thrusts: (i) Security by diversification and randomization; and (ii) Security through accountability and reputation. The solution is applied to secure routing, secure data aggregation, and distributed leader selection.Broader Impact: The project will significantly advance our understanding of the fundamental limits for security in wireless ad hoc networks. It will provide methods to design provably-secure wireless protocols for a large class of mission-critical applications. The results will be disseminated through public release of detailed design documents, software, and graduate course materials.