NECO: Provably Assurable Ad Hoc Networks under Arbitrary Malicious Behaviors

NECO：任意恶意行为下可证明可保证的 Ad Hoc 网络

• 批准号: 0831999
• 负责人: Xiaojun Lin
• 金额: $ 20万
• 依托单位: Purdue University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-09-01 至 2013-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0831999&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NECO; Provably; Assurable; Ad; Hoc

Ad hoc wireless networks are becoming important in several application domains. In these networks, nodes cooperate among themselves to achieve collective tasks, without requiring any pre-existing infrastructure. However, the cooperative nature and the possible hostile environments where the networks may be deployed make them vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks. Some of these attacks can be addressed through customized cryptographic primitives. However, the adversary can physically compromise the network nodes, and thus defeat the cryptographic measures. Further, the adversary may have much higher computational and communication capabilities than the legitimate nodes, and the malicious nodes can collude among themselves. This has created a difficult imbalance in securing ad hoc networks---defense is hard and resource-consuming while attack is often easy.In this project, the PIs at Purdue University are developing a provably-assurable ad hoc network protocol suite to invert this imbalance. The system developed can give guaranteed security properties under a wide, and rigorously quantifiable, range of adversarial behaviors, including Byzantine behaviors. The project employs two main thrusts: (i) Security by diversification and randomization; and (ii) Security through accountability and reputation. The solution is applied to secure routing, secure data aggregation, and distributed leader selection.Broader Impact: The project will significantly advance our understanding of the fundamental limits for security in wireless ad hoc networks. It will provide methods to design provably-secure wireless protocols for a large class of mission-critical applications. The results will be disseminated through public release of detailed design documents, software, and graduate course materials.

自组织无线网络在多个应用领域中变得越来越重要。在这些网络中，节点相互合作以实现集体任务，而不需要任何预先存在的基础设施。然而，合作的性质和可能部署网络的敌对环境使其容易受到广泛的安全攻击。 其中一些攻击可以通过定制的加密原语来解决。然而，攻击者可以在物理上危害网络节点，从而击败加密措施。此外，对手可能具有比合法节点高得多的计算和通信能力，并且恶意节点可以在它们之间勾结。这造成了一个困难的不平衡，在安全的ad hoc网络--防御是困难的，消耗资源，而攻击往往是easy.In这个项目中，在普渡大学的PI正在开发一个可证明的assurable ad hoc网络协议套件，以扭转这种不平衡。开发的系统可以在广泛且严格可量化的对抗行为（包括拜占庭行为）下提供有保证的安全属性。该项目有两个主要目标：㈠通过多样化和随机化实现安全; ㈡通过问责制和声誉实现安全。该解决方案适用于安全路由，安全的数据聚合，和分布式leader selection.Broader影响：该项目将显着推进我们的理解，在无线ad hoc网络的安全性的基本限制。它将提供方法来设计可证明安全的无线协议的一大类关键任务的应用程序。结果将通过公开发布详细的设计文件、软件和研究生课程材料进行传播。