Combinatorial Voting

组合投票

• 批准号: 0851704
• 负责人: David Ahn
• 金额: $ 39.15万
• 依托单位: University of California-Berkeley
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-02-15 至 2014-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0851704&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Combinatorial; Voting

Many elections decide multiple issues simultaneously with a single ballot. The desirability of certain issues depends on how others are resolved: a typical California ballot includes spending initiatives, bond measures, and tax propositions which jointly impact the fiscal positions of state and local governments. With such nonseparabilities, strategic voting over multiple issues introduces subtle considerations absent from single-issue elections. For example, a voter might support a school bond measure only if a proposition to increase the sales tax is also approved to mitigate the fiscal burden of financing the bond. Then, in deciding her vote on the bond measure, she should consider the probability of the complementary tax increase being approved. Moreover, since her vote on the bond measure matters only if she is pivotal, she should condition the likelihood of the tax increase under the assumption that the other voters have split equally on the bond measure.This project commences the equilibrium analysis of elections with interdependent issues. Existing models of strategic voting either consider a single issue or assume that preferences are separable across issues. For the more general environments considered in this proposal, the following fundamental questions regarding strategic voting are yet unresolved: Does a voting equilibrium exist? How is this equilibrium characterized? How does it behave as the electorate becomes large? How efficient is this equilibrium? The researchers study these questions in a voting environment with uncertainty, modeled as a Bayesian game. The project seeks to compare the expected efficiency of different mechanisms for these environments. For example, voting sequentially over issues one at a time progressively resolves uncertainty and may improve expected welfare. Second, the project aims to understand interdependent values and information aggregation with multiple issues. In particular, if each voter receives a noisy signal regarding the common values of different combinations, will the most desired bundle pass almost surely as the electorate (hence the amount of information) becomes large?Broader impacts. Twenty-four American states and numerous localities use referenda to decide an array of propositions, ranging from property taxes to affirmative action. Any progress towards institutional improvements in referenda could yield large social benefits. The popularization of direct democracy presents voters with an ever-increasing number of issues, along with the accompanying multiplication in the number of potential interdependencies. This project seeks to understand the strategic effects of nonseparabilities on voting, and their consequent impact on outcomes and welfare.

许多选举通过一次投票同时决定了多个问题。某些问题的可取性取决于他人的解决方式：典型的加利福尼亚投票包括支出计划，债券措施和税收主张，共同影响州和地方政府的财政立场。由于这种不分散性，对多个问题进行战略投票会引入单一发行选举中缺乏微妙的考虑。例如，只有在还批准增加营业税的提议以减轻债券资金的财政负担时，选民才能支持学校债券措施。然后，在决定对债券措施的投票时，她应该考虑批准补充税收增加的可能性。此外，由于她对债券措施的投票仅在关键时才很重要，因此她应根据其他选民在债券措施上平均分配税收的可能性来调节增加税收的可能性。该项目开始对相互依存问题的选举的均衡分析。现有的战略投票模型要么考虑一个问题，要么假设偏好在各个问题之间是可分开的。对于本提案中考虑的更一般的环境，有关战略投票的以下基本问题尚未解决：是否存在投票均衡？这种平衡是如何表征的？随着选民变得庞大，它的行为如何？这个平衡有多高效？ 研究人员在不确定性的投票环境中研究了这些问题，以贝叶斯游戏为模型。 该项目旨在比较这些环境中不同机制的预期效率。例如，一次在一个问题上进行依次投票可以逐步解决不确定性，并可能改善预期福利。其次，该项目旨在通过多个问题了解相互依存的价值和信息汇总。特别是，如果每个选民都会收到有关不同组合的共同值的嘈杂信号，那么随着选民（因此，信息量）变得更大？更广泛的影响，最需要的捆绑包会肯定会肯定。二十四个美国国家和许多地区都使用公投来决定一系列主张，从财产税到平权行动。全民投票的机构改善的任何进展都可能带来巨大的社会利益。 直接民主的普及为选民带来了越来越多的问题，以及潜在的相互依存数量的随之而来的乘法。该项目旨在了解不分散性对投票的战略影响，其结果对成果和福利的影响。