Self-Control at Work: A Field Experiment

工作中的自我控制：现场实验

• 批准号: 0961857
• 负责人: Michael Kremer
• 金额: $ 28.46万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-06-15 至 2012-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0961857&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Self; Control; Work; Field; Experiment

Research Hypothesis: A large body of theoretical and empirical evidence in economics indicates that self-control problems lead people to fall short of their personal goals (for reviews, see: Frederick et al, 2002; DellaVigna, 2009). If self-control problems influence behavior, they could have particularly important implications for the workplace by dampening worker productivity and leading individuals to earn less than they would like. In addition, they are likely to influence the optimal design of employment incentive contracts and how firms organize production (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2006; Clark 1994).However, there is extremely scant empirical evidence on whether self-control problems actually matter for explaining worker behavior. This project fills this gap by undertaking the first field experiment testing for such problems in a workplace setting. In doing so, the project seeks to make an important contribution to the economics literature on self-control problems and to the incipient literature on the implications of self-control problems for workplace design.Research Design: In economics, the self-control problem is often conceptualized as time inconsistency in preferences (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Laibson, 1997). If workers have self-control problems and are sophisticated about these problems, then time-inconsistency models offer four clear predictions: (i) workers will want to use commitment devices to get themselves to work hard in the future; (ii) their demand for commitment will be higher farther in advance of the work period; (iii) the availability of commitment devices will lead to increased effort; and (iv) their self-control problem will be less severe when earnings are paid in the same period as when work is performed.This project will use this set of predictions to test for self-control problems in a field experiment on full-time data entry employees. Workers will be offered a choice between two incentive contracts. The first contract will pay a piece-rate wage of w for each unit of production. The commitment contract will let workers choose a target level for themselves, and pay them w for each unit of production if they meet their target and only pay w/2 if they fall short of it. Although a worker can never earn more under the commitment contract and may end up earning much less, workers with self-control problems may choose the commitment contract to bind themselves to work harder in the future. The experiment treatments will vary the timing of when the commitment contract is offered (the evening before the workday versus the morning of the workday), as well as when wages are paid. Outcomes on worker choice and production will be used to test the set of key predictions. If all four predictions hold, this will provide clear evidence that workers face self-control problems, and that workplace arrangements can increase worker effort and earnings by mitigating the self-control problem. Broader Impacts: The optimal design of workplace arrangements changes significantly if workers have time-inconsistent preferences. Consequently, if the project demonstrates large quantitative effects of self-control problems, this would have important implications for how firms should incentivize their workers. It would also have ramifications for the design of government policies, such as job training programs that seek to reduce unemployment. In addition, these results would have implications for understanding labor markets?especially in developing countries where work arrangements are varied and include sharecropping, intermittent labor contracting, formal employment, and self-employment. Considering these arrangements through a self-control lens could deliver drastically new insights on labor market institutions, and on how the workplace can be structured to increase worker welfare.

研究假设：经济学中大量的理论和经验证据表明，自我控制问题会导致人们无法实现个人目标（有关评论，请参见：Frederick et al，2002; DellaVigna，2009）。 如果自我控制问题影响行为，那么它们可能会通过降低工人的生产力并导致个人收入低于他们的预期来对工作场所产生特别重要的影响。 此外，他们可能会影响就业激励合同的最佳设计和企业如何组织生产（O 'Donoghue and Rabin 2006; Clark 1994）。然而，关于自我控制问题是否真的对解释工人行为很重要的实证证据非常缺乏。 该项目填补了这一空白，在工作场所环境中进行了第一次实地实验测试。 在这样做的过程中，该项目旨在作出重要贡献的经济学文献的自我控制的问题和初期的文学作品的影响自我控制的问题，为workplace design.Research设计：在经济学中，自我控制的问题往往是概念化的时间不一致的偏好（泰勒和Shefrin，1981年; Laibson，1997年）。 如果工人有自我控制问题，并对这些问题的复杂性，那么时间不一致模型提供了四个明确的预测：（一）工人将希望使用承诺手段，让自己努力工作，在未来;（二）他们的承诺要求将更高的工作时间提前;（三）承诺手段的可用性将导致增加的努力;（iv）当收入与工作时间相同时，他们的自我控制问题将不那么严重。本项目将使用这组预测来测试全职数据输入员工的现场实验中的自我控制问题。 工人将在两份激励合同中做出选择。 第一份合同将为每一单位的生产支付w的计件工资。 承诺合同将让工人为自己选择一个目标水平，如果他们达到了目标，每生产一个单位就支付w，如果他们达不到目标，只支付w/2。虽然工人在承诺合同下永远不会赚得更多，最终可能会赚得更少，但自我控制问题的工人可能会选择承诺合同来约束自己在未来更加努力地工作。 实验处理将改变提供承诺合同的时间（工作日的前一天晚上与工作日的早上）以及支付工资的时间。 工人选择和生产的结果将被用来测试这组关键预测。 如果这四个预测都成立，这将提供明确的证据表明，工人面临自我控制问题，工作场所的安排可以通过减轻自我控制问题来增加工人的努力和收入。更广泛的影响：如果工人有时间不一致的偏好，工作场所安排的最佳设计会发生重大变化。 因此，如果该项目展示了自我控制问题的大量量化影响，这将对公司如何激励员工产生重要影响。 这也将对政府政策的设计产生影响，例如旨在降低失业率的职业培训计划。 此外，这些结果将对理解劳动力市场产生影响？特别是在发展中国家，那里的工作安排多种多样，包括分成制、间歇性劳动合同、正式就业和自营职业。 通过自我控制的透镜来考虑这些安排，可以对劳动力市场制度以及如何构建工作场所以提高工人福利提供全新的见解。