The Majoritaran Basis of Judicial Countermajoritarianism

司法反多数主义的多数派基础

• 批准号: 1024106
• 负责人: James Rogers
• 金额: $ 8.91万
• 依托单位: Texas A&M Research Foundation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-09-01 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1024106&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Majoritaran; Basis; Judicial; Countermajoritarianism

The project studies the conditions under which judicial institutions that protect minority rights can emerge in majoritarian political systems. It responds to the puzzle: Why don't legislative majorities curb courts that prevent the implementation of enacted legislation when those majorities have the constitutional ability to do so? The research team proposes that judicial protection of minorities can emerge as an unintended by-product of majoritarian politics. Popular majorities support judicial review because courts benefit majorities by protecting them against "corrupt" or "captured" legislatures. Researchers test this theory using a controlled experiment that assesses whether respondents? evaluations of the US Supreme Court relative to the Congress are changed by reports of congressional corruption, news of judicial decisions that conform to subjects? preferences, or an interaction of these two treatments.The proposed research is valuable for scholars of political development and institutional design, especially in democracies with multiracial and multiethnic societies. The project also contributes to graduate education.

该项目研究在多数主义政治制度中保护少数群体权利的司法机构能够出现的条件。它回答了这个难题：为什么立法多数派不遏制法院，阻止执行已颁布的立法时，这些多数派有宪法的能力这样做？研究小组提出，对少数群体的司法保护可能会成为多数主义政治的意外副产品。大多数人支持司法审查，因为法院通过保护他们免受“腐败”或“俘虏”立法机构的侵害而使大多数人受益。研究人员使用一项对照实验来测试这一理论，该实验评估受访者是否？美国最高法院相对于国会的评价因国会腐败的报道而改变，司法判决符合主题的新闻？偏好，或这两种处理的相互作用。拟议的研究是有价值的政治发展和制度设计的学者，特别是在民主国家与多种族和多民族的社会。该项目还有助于研究生教育。