Eliciting the Type Space in Extensive-Form Game Forms

博弈论提供了个体在战略设置（“游戏”）中的行为预测。它具有广泛的适用性，从企业之间的竞争到微生物种群的进化。但它的预测基于对人们信仰、偏好和理性的强烈假设。最近的实验室证据表明，标准的预测往往是不准确的，并且已经提出了一些新的理论来替代标准理论。但几乎所有现有的数据都来自于所选择的策略。首席研究员建议通过引出人们在玩这些游戏时的想法来进行更深入的挖掘。通过更好地理解潜在的思维过程，可以建立更准确的博弈论模型。除了这项研究之外，首席研究员还将邀请高中生到校园（特别是来自贫困地区的学生）了解经济学、实验和校园生活。在蜈蚣游戏中，有一罐钱，两名玩家可以选择“通过”或“接受”。如果他们通过了，罐子就会变大，另一个玩家就可以通过或拿走。如果他们拿了，那么他们拿了很大一部分，另一个玩家拿一小部分，游戏就结束了。如果在“t”段之后没有人拿，他们就平分这一大锅。逆向归纳法预测，理性的、自私的玩家将占据每一个节点。但是，如果一个选手看到对手传球，她该如何看待他呢？她应该继续相信理性，就像逆向归纳法论证所规定的那样，还是应该现在承认她的对手是非理性的可能性？不同的假设导致对游戏如何展开的截然不同的预测。过去的实验并不能很好地回答这些问题，因为它们只是观察玩家的行为。首席研究员将进行一些实验，在这些实验中，关于偏好和理性的信念也会在游戏过程中被激发出来。这些额外的数据将有助于理解人们对理性的看法是如何演变的，并开发出新的、更准确的预测，来预测人们在一般的顺序移动策略设置下的行为。

Game theory provides predictions of how individuals behave in strategic settings (`games'). It has an enormous range of applicability, from competition between firms to the evolution of a population of microorganisms. But its predictions stem from very strong assumptions on peoples' beliefs, preferences, and rationality. Recent laboratory evidence has shown that the standard predictions are often inaccurate, and several new theories have been proposed as replacements for the standard theory. But almost all existing data comes only from looking at the strategies chosen. The principal investigator proposes to dig deeper by eliciting information about how people think when playing these games. By gaining a better understanding of the underlying thought processes, more accurate game-theoretic models can be built. In addition to this research, the principal investigator will invite high school students to campus (particularly from under-privileged areas) to learn about economics, experiments, and campus life in general.In the centipede game, there is a pot of money and two players alternatively choose to `pass' or `take'. If they pass, the pot grows and the other player gets to pass or take. If they take, then they take a large fraction of the pot, the other player gets a small fraction, and the game ends. If nobody takes after 't' periods, they split the large pot equally. Backwards induction arguments predict that rational, selfish players will take at every node. But what should a player believe about her opponent if she observes him pass? Should she continue to believe in rationality, as prescribed by the backwards induction argument, or should she now admit the possibility that her opponent is irrational? Different assumptions lead to vastly different predictions about how the game will unfold. Past experiments are not especially insightful in answering these questions because they only observe players' actions. The principal investigator will run experiments in which beliefs about preferences and rationality are elicited during the game as well. This additional data will help to understand how beliefs about rationality evolve, and to develop new, more accurate predictions of how people behave in general sequential-move strategic settings.