Eliciting the Type Space in Extensive-Form Game Forms

博弈论提供了对个人在战略环境（“博弈”）中如何行为的预测。它具有广泛的适用性，从公司之间的竞争到微生物种群的进化。但它的预测源于对人们信仰、偏好和理性的非常强的假设。最近的实验室证据表明，标准的预测往往是不准确的，已经提出了几个新的理论来取代标准理论。但几乎所有现有的数据都来自于对所选策略的观察。首席研究员建议通过引出人们在玩这些游戏时如何思考的信息来进行更深入的挖掘。通过更好地理解潜在的思维过程，可以建立更准确的博弈论模型。除了这项研究，首席研究员将邀请高中生到校园（特别是来自贫困地区），了解经济学，实验和校园生活的一般情况。在蜈蚣游戏中，有一罐钱，两个玩家选择“通过”或“采取”。如果他们通过，锅增长和其他球员得到通过或采取。如果他们拿走了，那么他们拿走了大部分，另一个玩家得到了一小部分，游戏结束。如果没有人在“t”期后服用，他们就平分大罐。反向归纳法预测理性的、自私的参与者会在每个节点上采取行动。但是，如果一个球员看到对手传球，她应该相信他什么呢？她应该继续相信理性，就像逆向归纳论证所规定的那样，还是她现在应该承认她的对手是非理性的可能性？不同的假设导致了对游戏将如何展开的截然不同的预测。过去的实验在回答这些问题时并不特别有见地，因为它们只观察玩家的行为。首席研究员将进行实验，在游戏中也会引出关于偏好和理性的信念。这些额外的数据将有助于理解理性的信念是如何演变的，并开发新的，更准确的预测人们在一般顺序移动策略设置中的行为。

Game theory provides predictions of how individuals behave in strategic settings (`games'). It has an enormous range of applicability, from competition between firms to the evolution of a population of microorganisms. But its predictions stem from very strong assumptions on peoples' beliefs, preferences, and rationality. Recent laboratory evidence has shown that the standard predictions are often inaccurate, and several new theories have been proposed as replacements for the standard theory. But almost all existing data comes only from looking at the strategies chosen. The principal investigator proposes to dig deeper by eliciting information about how people think when playing these games. By gaining a better understanding of the underlying thought processes, more accurate game-theoretic models can be built. In addition to this research, the principal investigator will invite high school students to campus (particularly from under-privileged areas) to learn about economics, experiments, and campus life in general.In the centipede game, there is a pot of money and two players alternatively choose to `pass' or `take'. If they pass, the pot grows and the other player gets to pass or take. If they take, then they take a large fraction of the pot, the other player gets a small fraction, and the game ends. If nobody takes after 't' periods, they split the large pot equally. Backwards induction arguments predict that rational, selfish players will take at every node. But what should a player believe about her opponent if she observes him pass? Should she continue to believe in rationality, as prescribed by the backwards induction argument, or should she now admit the possibility that her opponent is irrational? Different assumptions lead to vastly different predictions about how the game will unfold. Past experiments are not especially insightful in answering these questions because they only observe players' actions. The principal investigator will run experiments in which beliefs about preferences and rationality are elicited during the game as well. This additional data will help to understand how beliefs about rationality evolve, and to develop new, more accurate predictions of how people behave in general sequential-move strategic settings.