STARSS: Small: Self-reliant Field-Programmable Gate Arrays

STARSS：小型：自力更生的现场可编程门阵列

• 批准号: 1526211
• 负责人: William Harris
• 金额: $ 23.71万
• 依托单位: Georgia Tech Research Corporation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-09-01 至 2017-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1526211&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: STARSS; Small; Self; reliant; Field

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are hardware circuits that can be reconfigured by a system user after being deployed. FPGAs are a compelling alternative architecture that may allow hardware performance to continue to improve at a dramatic rate. Unfortunately, systems that incorporate an FPGA may allow a potentially untrusted user to reprogram hardware after it has been deployed. Such a scenario enables novel security attacks that can leak a user's private information or corrupt critical information stored on a system, but are performed entirely in hardware. This project develops an approach for ensuring that FPGAs satisfy strong security policies even when programmed by an untrusted user that will incur no overheard for runtime performance. This research investigates techniques that automatically infer proofs of information-flow properties of circuits. This project designs and implements policy languages, proof languages, checking-circuit synthesizers, and proof generators, which in combination will dramatically improve the security of FPGA-based systems. These techniques will enable devices and data-centers to use FPGAs in novel circuit designs that satisfy strong, precise security guarantees and can be updated dynamically.

现场可编程门阵列（FPGA）是硬件电路，可以由系统用户重新配置后部署。FPGA是一种引人注目的替代架构，可以让硬件性能以惊人的速度继续提高。不幸的是，包含FPGA的系统可能允许潜在的不受信任的用户在部署硬件后对其进行重新编程。这样的场景使得能够进行新颖的安全攻击，这些攻击可以泄漏用户的私人信息或破坏存储在系统上的关键信息，但完全在硬件中执行。该项目开发了一种方法，用于确保FPGA满足强大的安全策略，即使是由不受信任的用户编程，也不会导致运行时性能的窃听。本研究探讨技术，自动推断电路的信息流特性的证明。该项目设计并实现了策略语言、证明语言、检查电路合成器和证明生成器，这些组合将大大提高基于FPGA的系统的安全性。这些技术将使设备和数据中心能够在新颖的电路设计中使用FPGA，以满足强大，精确的安全保证，并可以动态更新。