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Systems of epistemology in classical Indian philosophy: Prajñakaragupta (ca. 750-810) on the number of instruments of knowledge (pramana)

古典印度哲学中的认识论体系：般若笈多（Prajñakaragupta，约 750-810）关于知识工具（pramana）的数量

基本信息

批准号：
226063163
负责人：
Professorin Dr. Birgit Kellner
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2011-12-31 至 2016-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/226063163?language=en
关键词：
Systems epistemology classical Indian philosophy

项目摘要

Epistemology becomes a major branch of classical Indian philosophy in the course of the first millenium CE. Within the individual religio-philosophical systems such as the Nyyya, the Mymyysy, the Vaiyeyika, the Syykhya, as well as in Buddhist and Jain milieus, divergent approaches are taken to positing distinct „instruments of knowledge“ (Sanskrit pramana). These instruments, among which feature most prominently sense-perception and inference, are held to establish particular objects (prameya); they provide the basis for reliable and truthful knowledge. As epistemological thinking develops, controversies intensify as to how many instruments of knowledge there should be, and what kinds of objects they establish. These controversies effectively constitute an emerging discourse on the nature and boundaries of epistemological systems. They have hardly been touched upon in contemporary research, neither in philological and historical terms, nor in view of their more general philosophical implications. Their investigation will not only shed light on a hitherto dark area of classical Indian philosophy, but can be expected to provide further insights into the purpose of theories and systems of pramana in general, and possibly provide stimuli for further-reaching reflections on the nature and possibilities of epistemological system-buildings. Dignyga (ca. 480-540), the founder of a distinct logico-epistemological tradition in Buddhism, was probably the first to put forward a fundamental claim that the number of instruments of knowledge was limited: There are only two kinds of instruments of knowledge, perception and inference, because there are only two kinds of objects, the particular and the universal. Perception exclusively apprehends the particular, and inference exclusively apprehends the universal. With Dharmakyrti (ca. 600-660), the next great representative of the pramana tradition in Buddhism, the restriction of the number of instruments of knowledge becomes inextricably bound up with ontological questions. Within the long tradition of Buddhist epistemological discourse, this project concentrates on the contributions of Prajñykaragupta (ca. 750-810), one of the most original thinkers after Dharmakyrti, to the discourse on the number of instruments of knowledge. On the basis of newly accessible manuscript materials, the central section on this topic from Prajñykaraguptays Pramanavarttikalankarabhasya, a commentary on Dharmakyrtiys Pramanavarttika, will be critically edited, translated and studied in light of the overarching question how epistemological systems were construed and defended in classical Indian philosophy, and how ontological questions and disagreements affect controversies on the nature and character of systems of epistemology.

认识论在第一个千年的过程中成为印度古典哲学的一个主要分支。在个别的宗教哲学体系中，如Nyyya，Mymyysy，Vaiyeyika，Syykhya，以及佛教和耆那教，采取不同的方法来设定不同的“知识工具”（梵语pramana）。这些工具，其中最突出的特点是感官知觉和推理，被认为是建立特定的对象（prameya），他们提供了可靠和真实的知识的基础。随着认识论思想的发展，关于应该有多少知识工具以及它们建立什么样的对象的争论加剧了。这些争论有效地构成了一个新兴的话语的性质和边界的认识论系统。在当代的研究中，无论是从语言学和历史学的角度，还是从它们更普遍的哲学含义来看，它们都几乎没有被触及。他们的研究不仅将揭示印度古典哲学迄今为止的黑暗领域，而且可以预期将提供对pramana理论和系统的目的的进一步见解，并可能为进一步深入思考认识论系统建筑的性质和可能性提供刺激。 Dignyga（ca.佛教中独特的逻辑认识论传统的创始人（480-540），可能是第一个提出知识工具数量有限的基本主张的人：只有两种知识工具，感知和推理，因为只有两种对象，特殊和普遍。知觉只理解特殊性，推理只理解普遍性。与Dharmakyrti（CA。600-660），下一个伟大的代表pramana传统的佛教，限制的数量工具的知识成为不可避免地捆绑在一起的本体论问题。在佛教认识论话语的悠久传统中，本项目集中于Prajñykaragupta（约100）的贡献。750-810），最原始的思想家之一后，法身，对话语的数量工具的知识。在新近获得的手稿材料的基础上，《般若波罗蜜多》中关于这一主题的中心部分，一部关于《法体论》的评论，将根据印度古典哲学中认识论体系是如何解释和辩护的这一首要问题，进行批判性的编辑、翻译和研究，本体论的问题和分歧如何影响认识论系统的性质和特征的争论。