CAREER: Adversarial Artificial Intelligence for Social Good

职业：对抗性人工智能造福社会

• 批准号: 1905558
• 负责人: Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
• 金额: $ 44.75万
• 依托单位: Washington University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-08-01 至 2025-02-28
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1905558&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Adversarial; Artificial; Intelligence; Social

The success of AI technologies has resulted in their widespread deployment, with algorithms for reasoning under uncertainty, such as machine learning, having a particularly high impact. A challenge that is often ignored, however, is the adversarial nature of many domains, in which social, economic, and political interests may try to manipulate intelligent systems into making costly mistakes. While AI has a long history in playing adversarial games, such as chess and poker, the approaches have not been appropriate for many real-world situations. The goal of the proposed research is to develop a general framework for adversarial AI that is far broader in scope and applicability, building on insights from game theory, AI planning, and cybersecurity.A key modeling insight of the proposed research is that attacks across a broad array of settings can be modeled as planning problems, so that robust algorithms can be fundamentally viewed as interdicting attack plans. Our research will develop new foundational techniques for scalable plan interdiction under uncertainty, building off of the framework of Stackelberg games. Proposed techniques will leverage a combination of abstraction, factored representation of state, and value function approximation. In addition, novel scalable algorithms will be developed for multi-stage interdiction problems, modeled as sequential stochastic games, considering both perfect and imperfect information. Moreover, the research will make novel modeling and algorithmic contributions in multi-defender and multi-attacker interdiction games. Finally, in the more applied arena, the research will make significant intellectual contributions in applying advances in adversarial AI to model problems exhibiting important adversarial aspects, such as privacy-preserving data sharing, access control and audit policies, and vaccine design.

人工智能技术的成功导致了它们的广泛部署，机器学习等不确定性推理算法的影响尤其大。然而，一个经常被忽视的挑战是许多领域的对抗性，在这些领域中，社会、经济和政治利益可能试图操纵智能系统犯下代价高昂的错误。虽然人工智能在对抗游戏（如象棋和扑克）方面有着悠久的历史，但这种方法并不适用于许多现实世界的情况。拟议研究的目标是建立在博弈论、人工智能规划和网络安全的见解基础上，为对抗性人工智能开发一个范围和适用性更广的通用框架。提出的研究的一个关键建模见解是，跨越广泛设置的攻击可以建模为规划问题，因此健壮的算法可以从根本上被视为拦截攻击计划。我们的研究将在Stackelberg游戏框架的基础上，为不确定性下的可扩展计划拦截开发新的基础技术。提出的技术将利用抽象、状态的因子表示和值函数近似的组合。此外，将开发新的可扩展算法用于多阶段拦截问题，将其建模为顺序随机博弈，同时考虑完全和不完全信息。此外，该研究将在多防御者和多攻击者拦截博弈中做出新的建模和算法贡献。最后，在更多的应用领域，该研究将在将对抗性人工智能的进展应用于展示重要对抗性方面的建模问题方面做出重大的智力贡献，例如保护隐私的数据共享、访问控制和审计政策以及疫苗设计。

项目成果

Strategic Evasion of Centrality Measures

战略性规避中心性措施

• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
• 作者: Waniek, Marcin;Wiznica, Jan;Zhou, Kai;Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy;Rahwan, Talal;Michalak, Tomasz
• 通讯作者: Michalak, Tomasz

Learning Binary Multi-Scale Games on Networks.

学习网络上的二进制多尺度博弈。

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
• 作者: Yu, Sixie;Brantingham, Jeffrey;Valasik, Matthew;Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
• 通讯作者: Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy

On Algorithmic Decision Procedures in Emergency Response Systems in Smart and Connected Communities

智能互联社区应急响应系统的算法决策程序

• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: roceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
• 作者: Pettet, Geoffrey;Mukhopadhyay, Ayan;Kochenderfer, Mykel;Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy;Dubey, Abhishek
• 通讯作者: Dubey, Abhishek

Learning Generative Deception Strategies in Combinatorial Masking Games

学习组合掩蔽游戏中的生成欺骗策略

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_6
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Conference on Game Theory and Decision Theory for Security
• 作者: Wu, Junlin;Kamhoua, Charles;Kantarcioglu, Murat;Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
• 通讯作者: Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy

Controlling Elections through Social Influence

通过社会影响力控制选举

• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
• 作者: Wilder, Bryan;Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
• 通讯作者: Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy