Collaborative Research: Judicial Legitimacy in Comparative Perspective

合作研究：比较视角下的司法合法性

• 批准号: 1920915
• 负责人: Michael Nelson
• 金额: $ 9.82万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-08-01 至 2023-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1920915&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Judicial; Legitimacy; Comparative

Political incumbents around the world commonly introduce legislation to undermine or politicize the judicial branch of government, such as "packing" the court's membership, or reducing the court's ability to decide certain cases. Political scientists have long thought that citizens will punish incumbents who advance these "court curbing" proposals in the next election. Nevertheless, these attacks continue. This project seeks to understand the conditions under which voters are both willing and able punish incumbent politicians who undermine high courts, as well as the circumstances under which politicians may actually benefit from these interbranch assaults. The researchers will explain variation in citizens' support for judicial institutions in 12 countries as a function of their satisfaction with the court's policymaking, their democratic values, their support for incumbents, and the political context in which they live. Understanding the foundations and consequences of judicial legitimacy around the globe is essential for building and maintaining the rule of law worldwide.The key intellectual contribution of this study is the use of an original survey experiment, fielded in 12 countries around the world, to probe the electoral costs and benefits of interbranch attacks for incumbent politicians. The experiment relies on a novel dependent variable, a citizen's willingness to withdraw support from an incumbent who openly seeks to undermine courts, to examine directly a behavioral manifestation of legitimacy theory. Because public support is a theoretical antecedent to a willingness to punish incumbents for court curbing proposals, the surveys will contain validated measures of individuals' willingness to ascribe institutional legitimacy to judicial institutions, the first fielding of these items on cross-national surveys in over a quarter-century. With these original data, the researchers will test differences in the foundations of institutional legitimacy across countries. The theoretical framework for this research emphasizes the role of democratic values, a concept that is often referenced in existing studies of judicial legitimacy but has not been tested in a systematic fashion. This project therefore advances beyond earlier attempts to understand judicial legitimacy in its theoretical focus, experimental design, and the breadth of data incorporated into the study. Findings from this research will inform political scientists, legal scholars, policymakers and academics to better understand the public foundations of judicial independence and the rule of law, two foundational concepts in governance across continents.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

世界各地的政治现任者通常会提出立法，以破坏政府的司法部门或将其政治化，例如“包装”法院的成员，或降低法院裁决某些案件的能力。政治学家长期以来一直认为，公民将在下一次选举中惩罚那些提出这些“遏制法院”提议的现任议员。尽管如此，这些袭击仍在继续。该项目旨在了解选民愿意并有能力惩罚破坏最高法院的在任政客的条件，以及政客实际上可能从这些分支机构间攻击中受益的情况。研究人员将解释12个国家公民对司法机构支持的差异，这是因为他们对法院的决策满意，他们的民主价值观，他们对现任法官的支持，以及他们生活的政治背景。了解全球司法合法性的基础和后果对于建设和维护全球法治至关重要。这项研究的关键智力贡献是使用了一项在全球12个国家进行的原创调查实验，以调查现任政客跨部门攻击的选举成本和收益。这项实验依赖于一个新的因变量，即公民愿意撤回对公开试图破坏法院的现任法官的支持，以直接检验合法性理论的行为表现。由于公众支持是惩罚现任法官遏制法院提案的意愿的理论前提，调查将包含个人愿意将机构合法性归因于司法机构的有效衡量标准，这是四分之一个多世纪以来首次在跨国调查中对这些项目进行调查。利用这些原始数据，研究人员将测试不同国家机构合法性基础的差异。这项研究的理论框架强调民主价值观的作用，这一概念在现有的司法合法性研究中经常被提及，但尚未得到系统的检验。因此，该项目在理论重点、实验设计和纳入研究的数据广度方面超越了早先对司法合法性的理解。这项研究的结果将使政治学家、法律学者、政策制定者和学者更好地理解司法独立和法治的公共基础，这是跨大洲治理的两个基本概念。这一奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

The Costs of Court Curbing: Evidence from the United States

法院遏制的成本：来自美国的证据

• DOI: 10.1086/723021
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: The Journal of Politics
• 作者: Driscoll, Amanda;Nelson, Michael J.
• 通讯作者: Nelson, Michael J.

Are courts “different?” Experimental evidence on the unique costs of attacking courts

法院“不同吗？” 关于攻击法院的独特成本的实验证据

• DOI: 10.1177/20531680231188302
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Research & Politics
• 影响因子: 2.7
• 作者: Driscoll, Amanda;Nelson, Michael J
• 通讯作者: Nelson, Michael J

Accountability for Court Packing

法庭拥挤的责任

• DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2022.14
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Journal of Law and Courts
• 影响因子: 1.4
• 作者: Nelson, Michael J.;Driscoll, Amanda
• 通讯作者: Driscoll, Amanda